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ABSTRACT
Proposed regulations would restrict surface disposal of untreated
produced waters by oil and gas producers in coastal south Louisiana.
The

regulations

would

impose

costs

on

oil

and

gas

activity.

This

dissertation develops an integrated model of exploration and production
activities which utilizes both economic and geological

concepts,

in

which the cost of compliance with the proposed regulations is treated
as a reduction in the real net price of oil.
effects

of

the

porposed

regulations

on

The goal is to predict the
exploration

and

production

activity in the study region.
The

main

findings

are:

(i)

the

proposed

regulations

would

reinforce the trend of falling levels of exploration activity, (ii) the
rate

of

oil

production

from

existing

fields

would

not

be

greatly

affected, (iii) the minimum economic field size would increase somewhat,
and (iv) the productive life of fields would be shortened by less than
two years.

Generally, the effects of the regulations are estimated to

be rather small.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Any attempt to curtail domestic petroleum industry activity in
the face of mounting awareness of enviromental costs is viewed by many
as injurious to the national interest because of the effects on
economic growth and U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

The acrimony over

the issue of drilling in Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and
off the coasts of both California and Florida (see Powell, 1991)
illustrates the point.

In order to make good decisions about optimal

petroleum activity and methods we must know the costs and benefits of
the various options.
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop and implement an
environmental regulatory impact model for oil and gas activity in
coastal south Louisiana.

Specifically,

it will address proposed

regulations which would end the unrestricted disposal of oil and gas
produced waters into the surface waters of the state.

These

regulations would impose compliance costs on the petroleum industry.
This dissertation will determine what impact these regulations will
have on exploration and production activity in coastal south
Louisiana.

It will not attempt to quantify the benefits engendered by

these proposed regulations.
According to the Louisiana Administrative Code (LAC) 33:IX.708.B
(proposed), produced waters are defined as liquids and suspended
particulate waste material generated by the processing of fluids
brought to the surface in conjunction with recovery of oil or natural

gas from underground geologic formations or with underground storage
of hydrocarbons.

The regulations would forbid discharges of produced

waters directly onto "any vegetated area, soil, or intermittently
exposed sediment surface" as well as into freshwater swamp or marsh
areas other than "major deltaic passes" of the Mississippi and
Atchafalaya Rivers.

Produced waters discharged into intermediate,

brackish or saline water areas inland of the territorial seas would be
halted no later than 1 January 1995 unless a compliance schedule has
been submitted and approved.

Similar regulations are already in place

in north Louisiana and Texas.
In the Fiscal and Economic Impact Statement for Administrative
Rules submitted by the Department of Environmental Quality's Office of
Water Resources (undated copy), the effects of produced waters
discharged into surface waters are outlined.

These include

"significant quantities of petroleum hydrocarbons" accumulated in
sediments near the discharges and the formation of oily sheens on the
surface water.
be ingested
taste"

"Formation aromatic hydrocarbons in produced water can

by fish and shellfish resulting in objectionable odor and

(p. 3), and "produced water is toxic to aquatic life, and has

been shown to cause chromosome damage in juvenile fish".

Produced

water has been shown to contain benzene, ethylbenzene, toluene and
other "organic toxic pollutants" which are known to be human
carcinogens.

Finally,

"produced water may contain up to 2,800 pCi/1

226Ra, a radioactive isotope known to cause bone cancer" (p. 3).

A

survey by DEQ's Office of Water Resources found an "average of 176
pCi/1 226Ra and 180 pCi/1 228Ra in 403 produced water samples", a level

which is "600% over the Nuclear Regulatory Commission limits of 30
pCi/1 for unrestricted discharge of these isotops" (p. 3).

The FEIS

reports that it has been "repeatedly shown" that the discharge of
produced waters results in the degradation of receiving waters to the
extent that they fail to meet existing Louisiana water quality
standards.

This section of the FEIS concludes that "a human health

risk may be introduced by consumption of organisms tainted through
exposure to oil field waste discharges"

(p. 4).

These produced waters are generated by the production of oil and
gas (primarily oil).

When the oil is brought to the surface, it is

frequently in the form of an emulsion with water.

The oil and water

are separated, the oil is sent on to the refinery and the water is
disposed.

The proposed regulations allow for treatment of the

produced water and discharge into surface waters or injection of the
untreated produced waters into subsurface formations.

According to

the DEQ's Office of Water Resources the unanimous industry response
has been that subsurface injection is the least costly method of
compliance.

This compliance method will be assumed throughout this

dissertation.
The production of oil necessarily begins with a search for
pockets of oil and/or gas.

It is assumed that exploratory firms do

not know a priori whether a pocket contains oil, natural gas, a
combination of both in some ratio, or neither.

The process begins

with seismic or other surface activity in order to determine likely
locations in which to drill exploratory wells.

There are two types of

exploratory wells distinguished by location; those drilled in areas

known to contain petroleum or very near to known fields (called infill
drilling) and those drilled in relatively unexplored areas (called
wildcats).

Wildcat drilling will be addressed in this dissertation

because this type of exploratory drilling discovers new fields, while
infill drilling is usually undertaken to define the boundaries of
known fields or to hasten production from known fields.
Once a new field has been found production may begin depending
upon whether the producer expects the field to be profitable.

Given

development costs, some level of current oil prices, and expectations
about future oil prices, there is a minimum field size which will be
economic to develop.

Fields that are at least this size will be

developed; fields smaller than this will not be developed currently
but may be developed in the future.

As an active field is produced,

production gradually falls until the field is no longer profitable and
it is shut in (the producer halts production operations).

The exact

shut in point is dependent upon economic variables and the rate at
which production declines.
The contribution of this dissertation is to develop a fully
integrated exploration/production (E/P) model of oil and gas activity.
This model is calibrated on coastal south Louisiana but could be
applied to other regions (eg, the Gulf of Mexico Outer Continental
Shelf).

This integrated model is then used to compare E/P activity

levels with and without the produced waters regulations.

The

difference between activity levels with and without the regulations
will reflect the impact of the regulations.

5
The model incorporates the regulations by using an estimate of
compliance costs on a barrel of oil equivalent basis.

The estimated

compliance cost will reduce the net wellhead price (assumed to be
exogenous for coastal south Louisiana), and the activity levels at the
two different net wellhead prices will be compared.

Because of the

generality of the approach, this model could be used to gauge the
impact of other costly regulations or changes in the net wellhead
price of oil due to exogenous shocks on coastal south Louisiana E/P
activity.

With minor modifications the model could also be used to

assess the effects of different tax regimes on E/P activity in the
study region.
The estimated compliance cost is based on work done by Farber
and Dupont (1992).

They examined estimates of compliance costs on a

barrel of water basis from two sources and used the midpoint of those
two estimates.

The cost on a barrel of oil basis was derived by

calculating the median produced water to oil ratio for the affected
fields and using that figure to convert the cost estimate from a
produced water basis to an oil basis.
V

Walk, Haydel (1989),

in a study prepared for the Mid Continent

Oil and Gas Association, estimated a $7.00 per barrel of water
disposal cost.

This was based on the assumptions that producers would

inject produced water from their fields themselves, that new wells
would be drilled specially for injection in most fields, and that one
disposal well would be needed for every four producing wells (Walk,
Haydel, p. 3-4).

These are rather extreme assumptions.

It appears

that in north Louisiana and Texas most produced waters are handled by

6
commercial disposal (injection) operations and that considerably more
than four producing wells are handled by each disposal well (see Kerr
and Associates,

1990).

In addition, Walk, Haydel specified elaborate

pre-injection filtering and treatment systems that are not typically
used in the United States (Kerr and Associates, p.2).
Kerr and Associates (1990), in a study prepared for the
Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, contacted vendors and
contractors in south Louisiana and obtained estimates for the various
services and equipment necessary to comply with the regulations.

They

estimated that compliance would cost $1.66 per barrel of water
disposed, consisting of $1.32 per barrel for transportation (assuming
a 3 hour round trip by truck) and $0.34 per barrel for injection.

The

injection cost is an average for several commercial disposal
facilities in Louisiana.

It should be noted that there is evidence

that commercial disposal can cost as little as $0.25 per barrel of
water injected.

On the other hand, Kerr and Associates' estimate of

transportation costs may be optimistically low.

For fields which are

inaccessible except by boat, truck transportation of produced water is
not an option.

Transportation costs may be considerably higher than

that estimated by Kerr and Associates.
The heterogeneity of oil fields makes generalizations about
compliance costs suspect.

For fields which have ready access to

commercial disposal facilities the compliance costs may be quite low.
Fields which generate a higher than average volume of produced water
relative to oil will experience compliance costs which may be much
higher than those used in this dissertation.

Stripper wells (wells

which produce fewer than 10 barrels of oil per day) will probably fall
into the latter category, making them particularly susceptible to the
impacts of the proposed regulations.

The results of this dissertation

may not be applicable to specific fields because of the heterogeneity
of fields and the difficulty of generalizing about them.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

1. Introduction
According to Devarajan and Fisher (1981, p. 65), "there are only
a few fields in economics whose antecedents can be traced to a single,
seminal article.

One such field is natural resource economics;

. . .

its origin is widely recognized as Harold Hotelling's ’The Economics
of Exhaustible Resources'

Hotelling's 1931 article will be the

starting point for this literature review because most of the
theoretical literature on the topic follows from his work.

In

addition to theoretical articles, the econometric work on oil and gas
will be reviewed.

Engineering and geological models of oil and gas

exploration and extraction will be reviewed, followed by a review of
those models that combine geologic and economic approaches (the hybrid
models).

2. Theoretical Articles
Hotelling's "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources"

(1931) is

probably best-known for the 'r% Rule', which states that the price net
of extraction costs of an exhaustible resource must rise at the rate
of interest along an efficient extraction path.

He also showed that

this will hold in a competitive resource industry equilibrium under
certain conditions.

The by now familiar explanation is that if net

price is rising at the rate of interest a producer will be indifferent
between extracting the resource (and earning the interest r on the
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money proceeds) or leaving the resource in the ground and allowing the
value of the resource in the ground (the net price) to rise at the
rate of interest.
Richard Gordon (1967) developed a model of industry behavior
that built on the work done by Hotelling.

However, Gordon concluded

that "with increasing costs to cumulative output, the r per cent
profits growth rule no longer holds" (p. 283).

Gordon also asserted

that no form of resource extracting industry will ever completely
exhaust a mineral since higher expected future prices will always
cause profit maximizing firms to shift production to the future (and
reduce current output) in his model.
Dasgupta and Heal (1974) presented a much richer model in which
the elasticity of substitution between capital and the (exhaustible)
resource is explicitly taken into account.

They also introduced

technical change into their model, thus allowing the possibility that
at some future time the resource will no longer be required in order
for production to take place.

While this model is not precisely a

model of firm or industry behavior it does lead to some conclusions
about optimal extraction and price paths.

Dasgupta and Heal concluded

that "the conditions under which it is optimal to exhaust the
resource in finite time are really rather stringent" (p. 26).
found further that for "moderate" values of their variables,

They
"the

price of the exhaustible resource relative to output ought to be
rising rather rapidly" (p. 26), something which they pointed out does
not seem to be the case.
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Kuller and Cummings (1974) derived an analytical management
model of the petroleum reservoir that explicitly included some aspects
of reservoir mechanics and engineering.

Their most important

contribution was the recognition in a theoretical model that the level
of recoverable stock is to some extent dependent upon the time path of
production.

Kuller and Cummings found that the optimal rate of

production is that rate at which the "marginal net income to firm j
equals the user cost associated with firm j's production" (p. 73).
The user cost includes not only the impact of the current production
on firm j's internal future costs but also "all external effects"
including "effects on the aggregate recoverable stock" (p. 73).

This

is obviously not the same as the Hotelling Rule, but Kuller and
Cummings developed a model of reservoir management, the goal being to
"characterize optimal paths for production and investment for the
reservoir during all periods" (p. 71).
The studies mentioned above implicitly assume that the reserve
base is fixed, although some studies allow uncertainty about the size
of the reserve base.

Pindyck (1978) modeled both exploration and

production simultaneously and introduced the idea that the reserve
base is not fixed but can be changed by exploration for and discovery
of new sources of the resource in question.

This paper also

introduced the concept that resources such as oil and gas are best
thought of as nonrenewable rather than as exhaustible because economic
incentives can cause reserves to be maintained or even expanded
through further exploration.

Pindyck fails to point out that this is

only a short run phenomenom since exploration does not create reserves
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but merely moves the reserves (which must be finite) from the category
of unknown to known.

On a human time scale the sum of unknown plus

known reserves is fixed and immutable. Because Pindyck modeled
nonrenewable resource extraction as being heavily dependent upon
exploration activity, and further that extraction costs are partially
determined by the level of (known) reserves, he postulated several
price profiles that are determined by the initial level of reserves.
If reserves are initially large enough, price will rise steadily as
production proceeds.

In this scenario, exploration is put off until

near the end of the time horizon, depending upon extraction costs.
The more interesting price profile is one in which reserves start off
very small.

In this case, price begins at a very high level but

declines steadily while exploration builds up the reserves.

As

exploration and reserves then decline, price begins to rise, giving
overall a U-shaped price path.
In the Appendix to this model, Pindyck included a simulation
model using aggregate data for the Permian Basin region of Texas.
Pindyck simulated the model "repeatedly" while "varying the initial
conditions until the terminal condition . . .

is satisfied" (p. 857).

The terminal condition is that production, exploration and average
profit all become zero simultaneously at the cutoff (backstop) price
of $33 per barrel.
Hartwick (1991) showed that by reformulating Pindyck's (1978)
model the r% Rule holds under certain condition for resource
exploration and extraction firms.

Thus firms that explore and extract

simultaneously may still behave as Hotelling predicted.

Hartwick
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claimed that "buried within the technically complicated model of the
resource exploring-extracting firm of Pindyck (1978) is the classic r%
rule of Gray and Hotelling" (p. 141).
An adaptation of Pindyck's (1978) model that is pertinent to
this study is that of Yucel (1986).

In Yucel's optimal control model,

price is exogenously determined and extraction costs depend upon both
current and cumulative production (p. 202).

Both production and

exploration functions are Cobb-Douglas, and Yucel explicitly mentioned
process models in describing her exploration function.

However, the

most important aspect of Yucel's paper for this study is that she
investigated the impact of ad valorem severance taxes on exploration
and production.

Her simulation study, the functions and parameters of

which "were chosen to ’mimic' the Pindyck functions" (p. 217),
"confirms the static results that severance taxes in a competitive
market reduce production and exploration for exhaustible resources"
(p. 216).

The tax does not mean that the resource is conserved; new

reserves are developed more slowly but known rserves are depleted more
quickly.

On the other hand, Yucel found that "generally, the

deadweight losses are quite low" (p. 210).

She attributed this to the

fact that the impact of severance taxes on prices is cushioned because
the tax burden is to a certain extent absorbed by producers in the
form of lower rents.

One caveat is that this holds only for fairly

low severance tax rates (20% or less (p. 210)) since the tax becomes
more distortionary as the tax rate increases.
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3. Econometric Studies
Econometric models of oil and gas exploration and production
began to appear regularly in the early 1970's as a response to the
perceived shortage of natural gas.

Although these models were geared

toward explaining natural gas supply, many either included
considerations of oil supply or were easily modified to include oil.
Erickson and Spann (1971) presented a model of natural gas
supply that attempted to explain how natural gas exploration is
carried out and how economic variables affect the success of such
exploration.

They modeled this process with three equations

describing the number of wildcats drilled, the success ratio of those
wildcats and the average size of new discoveries.

They modeled all

three as a function of price; in other w o rds, as the price changes so
does the average size of new discoveries and the success ratio of
wildcat wells.

They took no explicit account of the physical effects

of continued exploration in a given region, reasoning that (in Texas,
at least) the prorationing system in effect in the period under study
created incentives for producers to find and develop smaller gas
fields and ignore larger ones.

In addition, as prices rose producers

were willing to drill less likely prospects and therefore the success
ratio of drilling fell.

Thus everything can be explained by the

wellhead price of oil and gas in this model.

Oil exploration was

included because the authors did not feel that there was any evidence
to indicate that firms knew in advance whether a prospect would be
categorized as an oil or gas field if successful.

In fact, a major
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point of the paper was to determine the cross price elasticities
between oil and gas.
Khazzoom's (1971) approach was slightly different from that of
Erickson and Spann.

Khazzoom defined two broad categories of gas

supply: new discoveries and extensions and revisions of existing
reserves.

He modeled each as functions of the ceiling price of gas,

the price of oil, the price of natural gas liquids and the previous
period's value of the dependent variable.

Khazzoom acknowledged that

new discoveries are determined by the number of wildcats, the success
ratio of those wildcats and the average size of new discoveries but
apparently reasoned that these factors are all functions of the prices
mentioned above and so did not use these factors explicitly in his
econometric work.

After estimating his equations for new discoveries

and extensions and revisions (he pointed out that "the quality of
available data on extensions and revisions leaves much to be desired",
(p. 59)), he performed a simulation of the industry in the future.
MacAvoy and Pindyck (1973) used an approach that is similar to
those of Erickson and Spann and Khazzoom, but on a more comprehensive
scale.

MacAvoy and Pindyck modeled natural gas supply with three

equations representing drilling, size of new discoveries, and
extensions/revisions. They use time series data from all 18 FPC
districts, giving them both cross sectional and time series data.
Again, price was implicitly a primary explanatory variable since they
actually use a revenue variable.
were also introduced.
equations.

However,

Drilling costs and a risk variable

No physical variables were used in the supply
in their production equation the explanatory
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variables were the log of wellhead price and the quantity of total
reserves.

Their major contribution was that they also estimated

wholesale demand and mainline demand.

In this way, they could

estimate excess demand for natural gas under various price scenarios
by comparing the production to the demand.

Given their reserves

supply model they could forecast future long run shortages or
oversupply.
Dennis Epple (1985) developed a "model in which the supply of
exhaustible resources is rigorously derived from a theoretical model
of optimal resource depletion" (p. 143).

Unfortunately, Epple treated

development and production as exogenously "determined by mechanical
rules" (p. 154); in fact, in his model "a constant fraction of
remaining reserves is produced each period" (p. 150).

This seems to

be the only way that he could convert the dynamic optimization model
into an econometric model.

He explicitly accounted for uncertainty

about future prices and costs and drove the model from an objective
function presumed to be maximized by the individual producers.

This

was an advance over previous econometric models because he explicitly
began with a dynamic optimization framework and then fit data to his
model to make it empirically operational.

This paper highlighted the

difficulties of using a dynamic optimization model to do empirical
work.

The fact that development and production are determined

exogenously makes the model useless for many applications.
McDonald (1991) attempted to estimate the discount rate for
producers implied by Pindyck's stochastic dynamic optimization models
of natural resource production (1980, 1981, 1982).

This was an

16
attempt to empirically test a dynamic optimization model, perhaps with
a view towards applying it to policy questions.

Lack of the necessary

data forced McDonald to specify cost and production functions outside
of the theoretical model, and his results are highly sensitive to
those specifications.

Nonetheless, McDonald estimated a discount rate

of 90.75% based on Pindyck's models (p. 164).

When he used a

deterministic version of the model, the estimated discount rate was
68.66% (p. 167).

These discount rates appear to be rather high.

McDonald concluded that "data limitations place severe restrictions on
our ability to test economic theory" (p. 167) and stated that his data
limitations were "most severe when it comes to measured resource
stocks and engineering cost data" (p. 167).

He also wrote that his

research "highlighted the dfficulty in bridging the gap between theory
and empirical analysis" (p. 167).
Deacon (1993) simulated tax effects on the petroleum industry in
the United States using a model that "adopts the general structure
developed by Pindyck (1978) and Yucel (1986)" (p. 160).
abstracted from all uncertainty.

The model

He found that the income tax "causes

only minor deviations from the untaxed solution" (p. 172), while the
severance tax "alters drilling and output to a much greater degree"
(p. 173).

The "dominant effect of the [severance] tax is high-grading

. . . resources that would otherwise be . . . produced are rendered
sub-economic by the severance tax" (p. 173).

However, Deacon's

results are sensitive to his estimated cost function;

"a data base

that would support precise econometric estimation of the cost function
that applies to this industry is not presently available" (p. 184).
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This article served to indicate that data restrictions on empirical
work in this area are troublesome.

4. Process Approach Studies
The earliest process model, and perhaps the most consistently
cited,

is that of Arps and Roberts (1958).

This model was only

concerned with oil field discovery, not production.

Arps and Roberts

developed a statistical model that described the number of fields of
various size classes that they expect will be found in a specific
geological region.

This was a purely mechanical model,

involving

economics only to the extent that they explicitly recognized that some
fields are too small to profitably develop.

These non-commercial

fields will not appear in the data and therefore must be accounted for
in other ways, since their absence from the data means that the sample
characteristics will only reflect the population characteristics for
size classes which are commercially viable.

Arps and Roberts' model

used a log normal distribution to estimate the remaining fields in the
study region.
M. K. Hubbert (1967) developed a process model in the strictest
sense.

Hubbert used historical drilling and discovery data to plot

the trend of increases in proved reserves per year and per foot of
exploratory drilling, then assumed that those trends would continue.
Depletion effects would cause the finding rate per year and per foot
of exploratory drilling to decline (p. 2215 and p. 2222).
Additionally, Hubbert projected annual production by observing that
"cumulative production since 1925 had lagged that of cumulative
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discovery by the nearly constant interval of 10-12 years" (p. 2 2 1 0 ).
In this way, Hubbert estimated both the remaining reserves in the
United States and the future time path of discovery and production of
those reserves.

Hubbert ignored economic variables completely

(although he stated that his model "is not based on assumptions of
static technology" (p. 2225)) and in this way missed an important
point.

Proved reserves are defined as those reserves recoverable

"under existing economic and operating conditions" (Cleveland and
Kaufmann,

1991, p. 145).

If economic conditions change, proved

reserves will change even in the absence of further exploratory
drilling.

Hubbert ignored this.

This is a serious shortcoming to his

and other process models.
Eckbo, Jacoby and Smith (1978) explicitly developed a
relationship between price and the minimum economic field size.

This

allowed them to estimate how various oil prices would affect reserves.
Their discovery model, on the other hand, excluded price as an
explanatory variable.

The discovery model was a probabilistic one

based on a lognormal field size distribution that was similar to the
work of Arps and Roberts.

Their "dry hole risk" was estimated based

on recent drilling history and the level of exploratory drilling was
based on announced plans by drilling firms.

Based on their estimate

of reserve additions and their calculated relationship between price
and minimum economic field size, the authors were able to estimate
future production for a given price of oil.

Finally, they concluded

that small changes in oil price will have almost no effect on overall
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reserves and production because the marginal fields are so small that
they contain only a tiny fraction of total reserves.
Attanasi and Haynes (1983) essentially updated the work of Arps
and Roberts.

They used 20 size classes in order to get more detail

out of the model, but still used a lognormal field size distribution.
They did not attempt to model how many exploratory wells will be
drilled in a given region, but calculated how many new fields (and of
what size class) will be found given some arbitrary number of wildcat
wells.

They estimated production from known fields on the basis of

historical production profiles of similar fields.

A similar study

with similar results was performed by Drew, Schuenmeyer and Bawiec
(1982).

A further study along these

lines was carried out by Drew,

Attanasi and Schuenmeyer (1988).

5. Hybrid Studies
The first hybrid model was developed by Uhler (1976) to estimate
a stochastic production function for the discovery of new petroleum
reserves.

His paper was a direct response to Erickson and Spann

(1971) and the shortcomings found inthat work.

Uhler

pointed out

that Erickson and Spann ignored the effects of the accumulation of
geological knowledge, the eventual exhaustion of undiscovered
reserves, and the tendency for the largest fields to be found first.
He overcame these problems by developing a process model and then
describing how it could be adapted to the econometric model of
Erickson and Spann.

Uhler's main concern in this article was

estimating the marginal exploration cost function.

He found that the
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marginal cost of finding new oil reserves (in Alberta, Canada) rose
rapidly over time.
Camm, et al.

(1982) developed a model of oil production that

included elements of both econometric models and process models in
order to quantify the effects of severance taxes on oil produced in
California.

They acknowledged that the price of oil determines

whether or not a field will continue to operate; unprofitable fields
will be shut in and profitable fields will continue to produce.
However, they contended that the rate of production out of active
fields is determined in large part by geological and engineering
considerations rather than by economic considerations.

Therefore

their production model was split into two parts: an economic test to
determine whether or not a field should continue to produce and then a
process model to estimate the rate of production and the rate of
decline of the production rate over time.

Deacon, et al.

(1990)

developed a model that was striking in its similarity to that of Camm,
et al.

Deacon, et a l . concluded that severance taxes of up to 9% on

the value of the oil produced will reduce total production over a
thirty year period by 7.7%, or about 799 mmbbl.

This implies that the

supply of oil in California is inelastic.
Kaufmann (1991) was also primarily concerned with production
rather than exploration.

He estimated a "natural" decline rate of

production based on work by Hubbert (1962) and then calculated what
production from a field or region would have been had it followed that
estimated decline rate.

This production profile "represents changes

in the physical resource base that are not captured fully by economic
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or political variables" (p. 113).

Then he found the difference

between the estimated production and actual production and called this
the residual.

He then used economic and political variables to

explain changes in the residual.

In this way, both geological and

economic factors were included in his production model.

Kaufmann

concluded that "oil prices probably do not contain all the information
that is needed to analyze oil production" and "that the U.S. has
depleted reservoirs from which oil can be recovered with a profit at
current prices . . . the econometric portion of the analysis indicates
that large increases in real oil prices are needed to offset the
decline in production that is associated with future movements in the
production curve" (p. 126).

6 . Summary

To summarize, there exist pure geological models of petroleum
resource exploration and production that exclude any economic
variables.

There also exist econometric models which do not account

for geophysical factors affecting oil and gas resources.

Neither of

these types of models is entirely satisfactory because neither employs
a full spectrum of explanatory variables.

Price and cost play the

dominant role in the exploration for and development of oil and gas
fields, while geological and engineering factors appear to determine
production rates.

Both types of factors influence the decision to

shut down a field.
Attempts to include both physical and economic factors have been
made for the most part only in production models (eg., Camm, et al.,
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Deacon, et al., and Kaufmann).

These models Indicated that physical

factors dominate economic factors in explaining oil production.
Uhler's hybrid model of petroleum exploration attempted to include
some geological factors in an econometric model, but did not use what
is now the generally acceped premise that fields are distributed lognormally by size in geologically homogeneous regions.

I could find no

hybrid models that did include this stylized fact.
This literature review also indicates that attempting to
operationalize a dynamic optimization model is extremely difficult,
particularly in view of the data requirements.

The results of studies

which have been done in this manner are not very satisfactory.
This dissertation will concentrate on developing a model of
petroleum exploration that explicitly recognizes the log-normal
distribution of fields by size, the tendency for the largest fields to
be found and developed first and the declining marginal returns to
exploration.

However, the model will also recognize the importance of

economic variables in determining the pace of exploration.

On the

production side, economic variables will dominate the models of oil
field development and shut down decisions, while geological variables
are expected to play the largest role in the model of production from
viable fields.

CHAPTER 3
EXPLORATION

1. Introduction
The exploration model consists of two interrelated systems.

The

overall goal of the model is to explain and predict exploratory
drilling and the number of fields which will be found by the predicted
exploratory drilling program.

This requires a model of how oil and

gas fields are distributed in the south Louisiana region and a model
to explain the number of exploratory wells drilled in the region.
Given profit maximizing behavior by firms engaged in exploratory
drilling, the number of wells drilled will depend to some extent on
the expected success of a drilling program.

To predict the success of

a drilling program, an estimate is needed of the number and size of
remaining (undiscovered) fields in the region.

2. Explicit Cost Function Drilling Model
It is possible to estimate a model of exploratory drilling for
south Louisiana which will allow a forecast not only of future
exploratory drilling, but also of the success rate of the drilling and
the expected sizes of the fields found.

Actually, this model will

attempt to explain wildcat drilling, a more narrowly defined activity
than exploratory drilling.

Wildcat drilling is undertaken

specifically to find new fields and is usually carried out some
distance from known fields.

Exploratory drilling in general can

23

24
include drilling around a known field in order to determine the
boundaries and size of the field.

These two types of drilling and the

associated risks are very different, and no doubt the economic factors
which drive them are accordingly different.

The following analysis is

confined to wildcat drilling since the point is to estimate how the
proposed regulations will affect the rate at which new fields are
discovered.
Firms which are engaged in wildcat drilling wish to maximize the
expected value of a drilling plan.

MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975) have

constructed an explicit function that begins with a series of models
for the pricing of capital assets under uncertainty (see MacAvoy and
Pindyck (1975), p. 67).

They represent the risk inherent in any

drilling program by the variance of the cash flow, so that the
certainty equivalent present value of net cash flow to a firm is

3.1)

V= ( 1 / r )

(ic-ka)

where it is the total end-of-period cash flow to the firm and JE-E(it) is
the expected value of it, o is the variance of i, X is an index of risk
aversion, and r is a long-term market interest rate.
MacAvoy and Pindyck use the following profit function:

3.2)

n = E ( n ) = W - R - C e (W)
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where W is the number of wells, R is the mean dollar receipts per
well, and Ce(W) is the expected cost of drilling W wells.

They define

the mean dollar receipts per well as

3.3)

R = ( S G. P e G + S 0 . P e 0 )

where SG and §0 are the mean sizes of discoveries of gas and oil per
well, respectively, and PG and Pq are the expected prices of gas and
oil.

By substitution into Equation 3.2

3.4)

JE’(fc) = (W ‘ S G. P Ge + W ‘ S 0 . P 0 e ) - C e (W)

They approximate the variance of the total end-of-period cash flow to
the firm by

3.5)

V a r (ft) = ( W ‘ S GV- (PGe)2 + W ' S QV’ (P0e)2) = W - S v ' P e

where SG and SG are the variances of the mean sizes of discoveries of
gas and oil per well, respectively.
To simplify matters and to make this series of equations
compatible with the reserve estimation work (Section 4) oil and gas
can be combined by converting the gas on a Btu basis to barrels of oil
equivalent (BOE).

Gas prices will be converted to dollars per BOE

($/BOE) in a similar fashion, and the two prices will be averaged,
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weighted by production volume shares.

Substituting these BOE

variables into Equation 3.1

3 .6 ) V = — ( W - S - P * - C e ( W - X - W - S v )

r

and taking the derivative of this expression with respect to W and
setting it equal to zero gives

3 ‘7) !o W
S = [S-Pe- ^d W- X - S v] /r = 0

as the optimality condition on wildcat well drilling.
All of this is conditional upon success in drilling.

In order

to introduce this concept, let § now represent the mean size of
discovery per successful well and let q> represent a measure of
expected success in wildcat drilling (for example, MacAvoy and Pindyck
use last period's success ratio).
At this point it is necessary to present a more explicit cost
function.

Since MacAvoy and Pindyck found that more drilling

increased the costs per well (MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975), p. 70),
they used a quadratic expression of the following form to represent
expected cost of drilling a well:

3.8)

C ° ( W ) = W + W - A T C + — W2

2
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where ATC is the historical average drilling cost per well.

The

marginal cost for a well is then

3 .9 ) ,
. ??*(»). = l + A T C + 2 W

dW

Now substitute this expression into Equation 3.7 to obtain:

3.10)

~

oW

= (<p - S - P a + [ - l - A T C - 2 W \ - W - k - S v ) / r = 0

Solving this equation for W gives the following expression for the
number of wildcat wells drilled

3 . 11)

&T=[<p - S - P e - A T C - X - S v - l ] / 3 r

The variance expression, Sv, used by MacAvoy and Pindyck consists
of the squared terms in the first expression in Equation 3.11, i.e.,
Sv-<p2SP e2 (MacAvoy and Pindyck (1975), p. 77).

The index of risk

aversion drops out upon aggregating over all firms in a region, and
according to MacAvoy and Pindyck (p. 71), the interest rate r from
Equation 3.2 drops out because the model in order to become
operational has now been converted to a one period model.

However,

MacAvoy and Pindyck add the interest rate back to their equation to
account for the multiperiod nature of the petroleum investment
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process.

Their final expression, adjusted for converting gas to oil

on a Btu basis, is:

3 .12)

W t = c 0 + C x ( R E V ) + C 2 (V A R ) + C3 (A T C ) + C 4 (I N T ) +€

where

R E V = ( S ) (<p) ( ( P . ^ P . z + P . j ) /3)

and

ra* = (5s) (<p2) ((P.1+P.2+P.3)2/9)

INT is the AAA corporate bond interest rate, ATC is the average total
cost of drilling a well, S is the expected size of discoveries, and 9
is the expected success ratio for exploratory drilling.

Note that the

expected price is proxied by a three year running average of past oil
and gas prices.

3. An Alternative Drilling Model
A similar approach to the problem can be made which does not
make an explicit assumption about the form of the cost function.
start by examining the "drilling plan", an optimal control problem
which establishes an optimal drilling path for the purposes of
planning.

The risk-neutral firm solves this control problem:

We
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T
3 .13)

P V = J n t (We , w c) • e ' T t d t

o

where w t is the number of wells drilled in period t and W t is the
cumulative number of wells drilled after t periods.

The discounted

profits of a future year's drilling (ie, the discounted profits of
drilling w wells in period t) is

3. 14)

itt = - ± - { P r ( W t , w t ) - P t ■ Q ( W t , w c ) - C t ( W c , w t ) )

where Pr(*) is the probability of success (which is a function of both
cumulative and current drilling activity); P is the expected price
path for oil and gas over the course of production from successful
wells drilled in period t1; Q is the expected size of oil and gas
discoveries found from drilling undertaken in period t; and C is
expected exploration, development, and production costs over the
course of operations of successful wells drilled in year t.
The shortcoming of the "drilling plan" approach is that costs
and prices are very uncertain, and a firm would not adhere to a long
term plan under conditions different from those assumed when the plan
was formulated.

Thus it is appropriate to consider each period's

drilling program separately.

In this case, the firm would seek to

1 Exploratory firms' price expectations are modeled very simply
in this work.
This may be a serious problem, as Margaret Walls and
others have pointed out (see Walls, 1992).
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maximize Equation 3.14 above, the profits stemming from exploration
activity undertaken next period.

This can be operationalized in the

following manner:

3 .1 5 ) n t= — ±-{Pr(W) -P-Q(W) -w-C(w)}
c 1 +r

The derivative of this function with respect to w is:

3 .1 6 ) 4 ^ = — — {Pr-P'Q-C')
aw
1 +r

Setting this equal to zero and solving for w (and assuming that second
order conditions are met) gives the optimal number of wells to be
drilled in period t,

3 .1 7 ) W * = w { P l , P , Q , C ' , r)

However, unless the specific form of the cost function is known (or
unless we are willing to make a rather heroic assumption about the
form of the cost function), we are limited to estimating a general
form of Equation 3.17 that may be mis-specified.

4. Technique for Estimating Undiscovered Fields
In estimating the remaining undiscovered fields In a region, it
is not enough to merely estimate total hydrocarbon reserves in the
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ground.

In order for the model to become operational an estimate must

be made of how the reserves are distributed by size .2

This makes a

difference because the smaller a field the less profitable
develop and produce that field, ceteris paribus.

it is to

Also, larger fields

typically have a larger surface area which makes them relatively
easier to find (see Arps and Roberts (1958), Drew, et al.

(1982), and

Attanasi and Haynes (1983)).
The process begins by dividing known fields into size classes
based on the amount of physically recoverable hydrocarbons in the
field at the time of discovery.

Since this distribution is not

readily available, it is necessary to estimate it.

This is done by

taking the latest year's production and multiplying it by 8.2 for oil
and 8.8 for g a s .

This figure is then added to the cumulative

production to reach the estimated field size .3
Following Arps and Roberts (1958), it is assumed that for any
given size class in a geologically homogeneous region, the probability
of discovery of a field in that class is directly proportional to the
number of undiscovered fields remaining in that class in the region
and to the ratio of the average surface area of fields in that class
to the overall area of the region.

This means that the largest fields

tend to be found first (see Attanasi and Haynes (1983), p. 11).

As

2 In this thesis, "size" means the amount of physically
recoverable hydrocarbons in a field at the time of the discovery of
the field.
3 This method was suggested to me by Dr. E. D. Attanasi, an
economist with the United States Geological Survey, during a telephone
conversation.
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drilling continues over time, smaller and smaller fields will be found
as the number of undiscovered fields declines in each size class.
From Attanasi and Haynes (1983), the analytical form of the
field estimating equation is:

3 . 18)

F t ( W) = F 1 ( oo)

(l-exp(-(Ci ‘ A s

-W)/B))

where Fj (W) is the cumulative number of fields in size class i expected
to be discovered after drilling W exploratory w e lls, F {(<») is the
ultimate number of fields in size class i (including both those fields
discovered to date and estimated undiscovered fields), B is the area
of the region (in this case south Louisiana, a geologically
homogeneous region), A- is the average area of the fields in size class
i , and C 1
- is the efficiency of discovery of fields in size class i
Fj(<») and

are parameters to be estimated.

There is one further factor which complicates this process.
Generally, only those fields which are economically viable (those
fields large enough to be profitably developed) are reported.

Fields

smaller than this may be found but not reported and thus are not (and
cannot be) included in the data.
this as economic truncation.

Attanasi and Haynes (1983) refer to

Economic truncation and the ensuing data

problem will cause biased estimates of Fj (“ ) and Cj for those size
classes in which the economic truncation occurs.

Economic truncation

4 When drilling is undertaken randomly, C. - 1; if, for example,
C i - 2 , then exploratory drilling is twice as efficient as drilling
which is randomly undertaken.
Note that 3Fj(W)/3C^ > 0.

will occur in the size class which represents marginal fields.

As

real oil and gas prices increased in the 1970's and again in the early
1980's, many of these marginal fields became economically viable and
were developed.

They appear in the data as being "found" at this time

when in fact they may have been found earlier.

A further statistical

complication arises from the fact that price is not the only factor
which influences economic truncation.

Small fields located near

pipelines and other infrastructure may be developed while fields of
the same size in other areas may not be developed.
To solve this problem, the work of Drew, et al. (1982) is
useful.
by size.

Drew, et al., assume that fields are distributed lognormally
They determine the size class which exhibits economic

truncation.

Essentially, this is the largest size class for which

discovery rates did not significantly decline over the period of oil
and gas activity in the study region.

Drew, et al. use as the

estimate of F|(<») for that size class the estimated ultimate number of
fields in the next larger size class (F-+1(«»)) multiplied by 1.65
(Drew, et a l . (1982), pp. 17-22).

They use this factor based on the

fact that in their study of the western Gulf of Mexico they found that
for size classes which did not exhibit economic truncation, each size
class had approximately 1.65 times as many fields as the next larger
class.

For size classes that do exhibit economic truncation, it is

only necessary to estimate the efficiency of discovery (Cj) using
Equation 3.18 after calculating Fj(») using an economic truncation
factor.

Obviously, the choice of a truncation factor will affect the
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results of this procedure and therefore the results of the forecasting
procedure.
Attanasi and Haynes' discovery process model will be used in
conjunction with the wildcat drilling model to produce forecasts in
the following manner.

First, using 1986 data, an average size of

discovery and a success ratio will be calculated (based on new finds
in 1986) by using the number and size of new discoveries and the
number of wildcat wells drilled.

These values will then be used in

the wildcat drilling model as the expected size of new discoveries and
the expected success ratio.

Using these and an expected price and

average cost, along with an interest rate, a forecast value for the
number of wildcat wells drilled in a year will be obtained (using the
estimated parameters on Equations 3.12 and 3.17).

The estimated

number of wildcat wells will be used in Equation 3.18 to calculate a
new Fj(W), using the estimated values of Fj (») and

.

The process can

be repeated indefinitely.

5. Data and Data Sources
The data used in the drilling equations (Equations 3.12 and
3.17) are summarized in Table 3.1.
giving 26 observations .5

The data run from 1960 to 1986

Annual data were used because the majority

of the data were not available on a monthly or quarterly basis.

5 While some of the data were available for years following 1986,
it was not in the same form and not subject to the same filtering
process as the other data.
They were not used.
The data prior to
1960 were sketchy, incomplete and unreliable.
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TABLE 3.1
DRILLING MODELS DATA SUMMARY

VARIABLE

MEAN

DESCRIPTION

WELLS

156.55

# of wildcat wells drilled
annually, 1960 - 1986

PRICE

$13.04

3 year running average of
weighted average price of oil
and gas on BoE basis

SUCCESS

0.089

success ratio of wildcat
drilling

SIZE

5742897

average size of new discoveries
in BoE

REVENUE

4231591

product of size, success and
price

VARIANCE

AVGCOST

INTEREST

9.455 x 10 12

$1458794

3.6%

same as REVENUE with terms
squared before multiplying
average cost to drill an
exploratory well
AAA corporate bond interest
rate
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The number of wildcat wells drilled each year in coastal south
Louisiana was obtained from Louisiana Energy Statistics. 1909-1989.
(see Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 in that publication).

These data also

provided the success ratios for exploratory drilling as it was broken
down into "Oil", "Gas" and "Dry".

The simple ratio of "Oil" plus

"Gas" to "Dry" was used as the success ratio.

The success ratio for a

given year was used as the expected probability of success for the
next year.
The average size of newly discovered fields was determined by
first listing all fields in the study region in order of discovery.
Discovery dates were provided by the Louisiana Geological Survey
(Lindstedt, et a l . , 1991) and checked with data from the Louisiana
Office of Conservation.

Then the initial size of the field was

estimated using the procedure described above, and the average size of
fields discovered in each year was then calculated.

Again, the

average size of new discoveries was used as the expected size of new
discoveries in the following year.

However, oil and gas were combined

on a Btu basis by converting the gas from a cubic foot measure to a
barrel of oil equivalent measure on the basis of the Btu content of a
cubic foot of gas compared to a barrel of o i l .6

This is a reasonable

approach since oil and gas are joint products of exploratory drilling.
The average cost data were obtained from publications of the
Hughes Tool Company located at the Center for Energy Studies.

The

data consisted of nominal dollar spending on exploratory drilling (not

6 The factor to convert 1,000 cubic feet of natural gas to a
barrel of oil equivalent measure is 0.178.
This factor can be found
in almost any petroleum engineering textbook or handbook.
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only wildcat drilling but all exploratory drilling) in coastal south
Louisiana on an annual basis.

This value was divided by the number of

all exploratory wells drilled in coastal south Louisiana to generate
an average cost of drilling all exploratory wells.

This is not

precisely an average cost of drilling a wildcat well, but the
differences are very likely small.

While the factors driving wildcat

drilling and the associated risks are not the same as those affecting
other exploratory drilling activities, the actual process of drilling
the wells is very similar.

The actual costs of drilling are therefore

assumed to be very similar.
The price data used are the price of oil and natural gas at the
wellhead in south Louisiana, obtained from Louisiana Energy
Statistics. 1909-1989. Table V.l.

The price data were converted to an

average price for oil and gas on a Btu basis (in the same manner that
the volumes were converted), weighted by the shares of oil and gas
discovered in each year.

Expected price was proxied very simply by

using a three years running average of the price per Btu.

This simple

price expectations process may be a serious problem and more research
is needed in this area.
All of the price and cost data except for the interest rate
variable were converted to real 1987 dollars using the GNP price
deflator.

The interest rate variable is the AAA corporate bond

interest rate according to Citibase.

The GNP deflator was also

obtained from Cit?.base.
The data used in the discovery process model were collected from
many of the same sources.

First, the known fields were divided into
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classes based on the amount of physically recoverable hydrocarbons
initially in place.

See Table 3.2 for the upper and lower limits of

the size classes; these classes are based on those used by Attanasi
and Haynes.

The cumulative and annual production were obtained from

the 1987 edition of the Annual Oil and Gas Report.

The initial

production dates were obtained from Lindstedt, et al,, 1991.

These

initial production dates are the best available proxy for the finding
date.

In each size class, the fields were ordered by date of first

production.

The cumulative number of wells drilled up to the time of

"discovery" was paired with each field.

These two data points are

Fj(W) and W, respectively (see Equation 3.18).
The basin size (ie, the size of coastal south Louisiana in
acres) was obtained from the Louisiana Almanac by adding together the
areas of each parish in the region.

The average size of the fields in

each class was obtained from the Louisiana Geological Survey, and then
fitted using a quadratic expression.

This was done because of

problems with the raw data (the raw data were based on the number of
wells in the field and the spacing between wells required by state
law).

See Table 3.2 for the size classes used, the known number of

fields in each class, and the average acreage (A^) for each size class.
The number of observations for each size class when estimating
Equation 3.18 differed, not only because of the different number of
known fields but also because before 1946 the records were rather
sketchy.

There are periods of several years when no fields are

reported in the data as beginning production, but then a large number
of fields are reported as being found (or starting production, to be
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TABLE 3.2
DISCOVERY PROCESS MODEL DATA SUMMARY

SIZE
CLASS

MHJMBER OF
KNOWN
FIELDS

AVERAGE
AREA OF
FIELDS
IN ACRES

UPPER LIMIT OF
CLASS (IN MILLIONS
OF BoE)

1

17

7883

1137

337

2

24

6061

280

170

3

25

4041

161

85

4

48

2596

84

42

5

54

1748

41

21

6

41

1310

20

10.5

7

50

1096

10.4

5.0

8

32

979

4.8

2.5

9

33

923

2.2

1.2

10

19

900

1.2

0.66

11

15

887

0.58

0.34

12

15

880

0.30

0.17

13

11

877

0.16

0.09

14

9

875

0.07

0.04

15

8

874

0.04

0.02

16

5

874

0.019

0.010

17

5

873

0.007

0.004

18

4

873

0.004

0.0019

19

6

873

0.0019

LOWER LIMIT OF
CLASS (IN
MILLIONS OF BoE)

NA
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more precise) in the next year.

The war years 1940 to 1946 are

particularly problematic.

6 . Empirical Results

While Equation 3.12 can be estimated as it is shown, Equation
3.17 cannot be estimated without ascribing some form to the equation.
Without knowing the precise form of the variable functions,
particularly the cost function, it is only possible to estimate a
general form of Equation 3.17.

In this c a s e , a linear equation is

estimated using a second-order autocorrelation model.
coefficients on the lag parameters are significant.

The
The complete

results are presented in Table 3.3 .7
A n interesting result of these regressions is that the
coefficient on AVGCOST is positive.

This is an unexpected result, as

it implies that rising costs have a positive influence on drilling
activity.

One possible explanation is that the average cost data are

capturing the utilization rate of drilling equipment; as drilling
levels increase the price of the necessary equipment is bid up,
leading to higher costs (i.e., an increasing cost industry).

This

parameter estimate is insignificant in the regression based on
Equation 3.17.
The parameter on the price variable In Table 3.3 is 3.357.
standard error of the estimate is 1.306.

The

Using the mean value of the

7 The regression model based on Equation 3.17 was also run in log
form.
However, the results were inferior in terms of the t-statistics
and the Schwartz and Akaike information criterion.
The log form
resulted in a weaker estimated relationship between price and wildcat
drilling but was generally similar to the results for Equation 3.17.
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TABLE 3.3
DRILLING MODELS REGRESSION RESULTS

VARIABLE

PARAMETER ESTIMATE
(T RATIO)

INTERCEPT

166.25
(7.798)*

PRICE

3.357
(2.569)**

SUCCESS

SIZE

PARAMETER ESTIMATE
(T RATIO)
161.08
(12.239)*

252.66
(1.119)
0.000002

(1.835)***
REVENUE

0.000012

(3.091)*
VARIANCE

AVGCOST

1.97E-12
(-1.889)***
0.00001

0.00002

(1.071)

(2.554)**

INTEREST

-770.35
(-2.428)**

-401.8
(-2.068)***

REG R 2

0.6

0.6

TOTAL R 2

0.5

0.5

SBC 1

246.67

247.52

AIC 2

236.92

238.98

DURBINWATSON 3

2.2559

1.6344

* Significant at 0.01 level.
** Significant at 0.05 level.
*** Significant at 0.10 level.

1 Schwartz Information Criterion.
2 Akaike Information Criterion.
3 Durbin-Watson statistic before data transformation.

wildcat well variable (156.55) and the mean of the price variable
(13.04), the price elasticity of wildcat drilling is calculated to be
0.279.

In other words, a 1% change in the price of oil and gas is

estimated to lead to a change in wildcat drilling activity of less
than 0.3% (the relationship is positive).
elasticity for the full sample.

This

This result is

is an average
counter-intuitive; it

is generally thought that higher oil prices greatly stimulate drilling
activity.

If the parameter was higher by an amount equal to the

standard error (i.e., equal to 4.663) the elasticity estimated in the
same manner would be 0.338.
One possible explanation for this result is the presence of
multicollinearity.

A collinearity diagnostic performed on this data

shows that price and interest rate are linearly

related (the

correlation coefficient is 0.85).

may be related toboth

Average cost

the price and interest rate (correlation coefficients of (0.77 and
0.76, respectively).

The presence of multicollinearity may prevent

the econometric model from detecting the full impact of price on
wildcat drilling.

However,

the parameter estimates are stable around

the reported values when variables are removed from the regression.
It has been suggested that because of a changing regulatory
environment, drilling firms may have changed the way in which they
formed expectations about future prices.

During the early part of

this period prices were quite stable; after 1972, prices were less
stable and regulated in a way that kept them under the world price.
Since complete deregulation in 1982, prices have been very volatile.
To determine the role played by these differing environments in the

A3
relationship between price and wildcat drilling, a three regime model
was estimated.

The resulting coefficients on the two early regime

(i.e., from the first period to 1972 and from 1973 to 1982) price
parameters were negative.

The third regime coefficient was positive

but smaller than the estimated coefficient for the overall model.
Under the assumption that during the earliest regime, when prices were
most stable, the price variable used in this model most nearly
represented drillers' expectations, this result is unexpected.

The

very stability of the prices means that there is almost no variability
in the data and this fact may cause problems for the estimating
program in the earliest regime.
The results of the discovery process model are presented in
Table 3.A.

The full work was done only for size classes 1 through 8,

the largest size classes.
calculating

The other classes were handled by

(») using an economic truncation factor, and then

calculating Cj using Equation 3.18 by plugging in the calculated values
of Fj(a®).

This was done because an examination of the raw data

indicates that economic truncation sets in with size class 8.

Table

3.2 shows that the number of known fields in each class declines
steadily after size class 7, while we expect that the distribution of
fields by size class is lognormal (see Attanasi and Drew, 1985).
Based on the relationship between size classes 1 through 8, an
economic truncation factor of 1.2 was used to estimate F-(») for
classes 9 through 19.
1.00.

The value of C { for classes 9 through 19 is

This is in part the result of the economic truncation that is

taking place; it is possible that the efficiency of discovery is
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TABLE 3.4
DISCOVERY PROCESS MODEL REGRESSION RESULTS

CLASS

KNOWN FLDS

Fj (“)

C«

1

17

17

4.48

2

24

24

3.96

3

25

25

3.48

4

48

48

4.01

5

54

54

3.24

6

41

47.8

1.48

7

50

57.7

1.98

8

32

49.6

1.17

9

33

55

1.00

10

19

66

1.00

11

15

79

1.00

12

15

95

1.00

13

11

114

1.00

14

9

137

1.00

15

8

164

1.00

16

5

197

1.00

17

5

236

1.00

18

4

284

1.00

19

6

341

1.00

For size classes 9 through 19, the ultimate number of fields
(Fjf00)) is estimated using the economic truncation factor (1.2).
See
text for details.
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greater than 1.00 for some or all of these size classes.

However, I

see no way to accurately estimate C. for these classes given the
limitations of the data.

This problem will adversely affect the

forecasts of drilling activity by understating the rate at which new
fields are discovered.8
Given the results of the drilling models and the discovery
process model, it is possible to make forecasts of drilling activity
in coastal south Louisiana.

This is done by using the 1986 success

ratio and average size of new discoveries as the expected values of
those variables for 1987.

Using these values and a value for the

expected price along with the parameter estimates from the two
drilling models results in a forecast of the number of wildcat wells
drilled in 1987.9

By using this forecast in Equation 3.18, an

estimate can be made of the average size of new discoveries and the
success ratio.

This allows a forecast for 1988 in the same fashion

that the 1987 forecast is made.

This recursive process is repeatable.

Since the number of wildcat wells drilled is known for the years
1987 through 1990, the forecasting was broken into two stages.

First,

forecasts were made for 1987 through 1990 using three different price
paths (and average costs for the model based on Equation 3.12) so that

8 Other economic truncation factors were also used.
The
relationship between the first 8 classes was fitted using a quadratic
function, and this was applied to classes 9 through 19. A factor of
1.65 was used based on the work of Drew, et al.
These two factors
gave very unrealistic results.
For instance, using a factor of 1.65
indicates that there may be as many as 10,000 undiscovered fields in
coastal south Louisiana.
9 The average cost variable was dropped from the forecasting using
Equation 3.17 since it was insignificant in that model.
It was
retained for forecasting using Equation 3.12.
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a comparison could be made between the forecasts and the actual
activity.

Then a forecast was made for 1991 through 2001 using the

price path that gave the best results in the first stage.
One other adjustment was made.

In 1986, oil prices dropped

precipitously and became more volatile.

This indicates that a change

in the structural equations also occurred.

This fact is recognized by

calibrating the model to 1987, by calculating a new intercept
parameter that forces the model to accurately forecast the level of
wildcat drilling in 1987.

This procedure was carried out for both

wildcat drilling models.
Table 3.5 shows calibrated and uncalibrated forecasting results
based on Equation 3.17 for 1987 through 1990.

Three different price

paths were used: the actual price for each year, the real price in
1986 (used for each year), and the real price in 1986 increased 2%
each year.

The calibrated model using the actual price matches most

closely with the actual numbers of wildcat wells drilled during the
period.
In Table 3.6, the results of the same procedures carried out
using Equation 3.12 are presented.

In this case, the different price

paths also correspond to different average cost figures.

The actual

average cost, the real 1986 average cost (used for each year of the
forecast), and the real 1986 average cost increased 2% each year were
used.

Again, the calibrated model using the actual price and average

cost most accurately forecasted the level of wildcat drilling.
The second stage of forecasting using the calibrated model based
on Equation 3.17 and the actual real price of oil and gas in 1990
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TABLE 3.5
DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990
Uncalibrated Model

YEAR

ACTUAL WELLS

ACTUAL P

CONSTANT P

+2%/YR P

1986

149

149

149

149

1987

79

165

170

171

1988

66

159

163

165

1989

51

151

161

164

1990

46

158

163

167

DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990
Model Calibrated to 1987

YEAR

ACTUAL WELLS

ACTUAL P

CONSTANT P

+2%/YR P

149

149

149

1986

149

1987

79

79

84

85

1988

66

72

77

79

1989

51

65

75

77

1990

46

73

77

82

NOTES: Actual P is the actual real price of oil and gas at the wellhead
in south Louisiana; Constant P is the real price of oil and gas at the
wellhead in south Louisiana in 1986 (used for all five years of the
forecast); +2%/yr P is the real price of oil and gas at the wellhead in
south Louisiana in 1986 increased by 2% per year over the five years of
the forecast.
The actual AAA corporate bond interest rate was used in
all cases.
The calibrated model was calibrated to 1987.
See text for
details.
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TABLE 3.6
DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990
MacAvoy and Plndyck Model, Uncalibrated

YEAR

ACTUAL WELLS

1986

149

1987

79

1988

66

1989
1990

j

ACTUAL P

CONSTANT P

+2%/YR P

149

149

149

160

161

154

158

159

51

155

157

158

46

154

157

160

149

DRILLING FORECASTING RESULTS, 1987 - 1990
MacAvoy and Pindyck Model, Calibrated to 1987

YEAR

ACTUAL WELLS

|

ACTUAL P

CONSTANT P

+2%/YR P

1986

149

149

149

149

1987

79

79

90

91

1988

66

84

88

89

1989

51

84

86

87

1990

46

84

87

90

NOTES: Actual P is the actual real price of oil and gas at the wellhead
in south Louisiana for each year of the forecast; Constant P is the real
1986 price of oil and gas at the wellhead in south Louisiana (used for
each year of the forecast); +2%/yr P is the real 1986 price of oil and
gas at the wellhead in south Louisiana increased 2% each year of the
forecast.
The actual AAA corporate bond interest rate was used in each
case.
See text for details.

49
resulted in the forecasts shown in Table 3.7.

The results show that

the number of wildcat w e l l s , the number of new fields expected to be
found, the size of those fields and the success ratio of wildcat
drilling all decline more or less smoothly.

This is consistent with

the underlying theory, since we expect the largest fields to be found
first and smaller fields to be found as drilling continues.
addition,

In

it is expected that it will become more and more difficult

to find new fields as more drilling takes place, since smaller fields
are more difficult to find.
Table 3.8 shows the results of the same procedures carried out
with the calibrated wildcat drilling model of Equation 3.12.
the actual real 1990 price and average cost are used.

Again,

The forecasts

are broadly similar to those presented in Table 3.7, although the
Equation 3.12 model consistently predicts higher levels of wildcat
drilling.
The final step is to determine how the proposed regulations will
affect wildcat drilling.

This requires an estimate of compliance

costs on a barrel of oil equivalent basis.

Several estimates of total

cost of compliance exist, but it is necessary to convert them from a
cost per unit of water produced to a cost per barrel of oil produced.
This is difficult because for any given field the ratio of produced
waters to oil and gas changes over the life of the field.

It is

different for every field and is not known prior to the start of
production operations.
Farber and Dupont (1992) have calculated an average compliance
cost on a barrel of oil equivalent (BoE) basis.

They examined the
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TABLE 3.7
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING, 1991 - 2001
Model Calibrated to 1987

YEAR

WELLS

NEW FIELDS

SUCCESS

SIZE

1991

67

5

0.084

251460

1992

67

6

0.084

251360

1993

66

5

0.083

251261

1994

67

6

0.082

251162

1995

66

5

0.082

251065

1996

66

5

0.081

250968

1997

66

6

0.080

250872

1998

66

5

0.079

250777

1999

65

5

0.079

250683

2000

65

5

0.078

250589

2001

66

5

0.077

250496

NOTES: New Fields is the number of new fields predicted to be found of
all size classes, rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the
success ratio (number of new fields before rounding divided by the
number of wells predicted to be drilled); Size is the average size of
the predicted new discoveries in barrels of oil equivalent; Wells is the
predicted number of wildcat exploratory wells drilled in each year. The
actual real 1990 price ($12.56/BoE) and the actual 1990 AAA corporate
bond interest rate were used for each year.
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TABLE 3.8
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING, 1991 - 2001
MacAvoy and Pindyck Model, Calibrated to 1987

YEAR

WELLS

NEW FIELDS

SUCCESS

SIZE

1991

85

7

0.084

251396

1992

84

7

0.083

251271

1993

84

7

0.082

251147

1994

85

7

0.081

251023

1995

84

7

0.080

250900

1996

84

6

0.080

250779

1997

85

7

0.079

250658

1998

84

6

0.078

250537

1999

84

7

0.077

250418

2000

84

6

0.076

250300

2001

84

6

0.075

250182

NOTES: New Fields is the number of new fields predicted to be found of
all size classes, rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the
success ratio (number of new fields before rounding divided by the
number of wells predicted to be drilled); Size is the average size of
the predicted new discoveries in barrels of oil equivalent; Wells is the
predicted number of wildcat exploratory wells drilled in each year. The
actual real 1990 price ($12.56/BoE) and Avgcost ($1229786) were used,
as well as the 1990 AAA corporate bond interest rate, for each year.

52
ratio of produced waters to produced hydrocarbons for fields in south
Louisiana and then chose the median value of these ratios.

They used

this median value to convert two compliance cost estimates to a cost
per barrel of oil basis.

The two compliance cost estimates were from

a study by Walk, Haydel and Associates (1989) and Kerr and Associates.
The Walk, Haydel study indicated a cost per BoE of $1.13, based on the
assumptions that the regulations would require one injection well for
every four active wells and that all injection wells would have to be
drilled (as opposed to using existing but abandoned wells).

The Kerr

study indicated a cost of $0.27/BoE based on the cost of subsurface
injection of produced waters at commercial injection facilities.
Neither of these estimates is without problems (see Chapter 1), but
given that no other estimates are available Farber and Dupont used the
average of these two estimates, $0.70 per barrel of oil equivalent, as
their compliance cost.

This estimate of the compliance cost is also

used in this study.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out to compare the impact of
the various compliance cost estimates and different parameter
estimates for the price variable.
3.9.

The results are presented in Table

The columns represent the parameter estimates: in the center is

the reported estimate (3.357), on the right is the parameter plus the
standard error (4.663), while on the left is the parameter minus the
standard error (2.051).

The rows represent the different compliance

cost estimates discussed previously, starting with the Walk, Haydel
estimate at the top.

The numbers inside the table are the changes in

the number of wildcat wells drilled in a year, reported as negative
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TABLE 3.9
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SUMMARY

P - 2.051

P - 3.357

P - 4.663

COST

EFFECT

COST

EFFECT

COST

EFFECT

|

$1.13

-2.26

$1.13

-3.79

$1.13

-5,

1

0.70

-1.4

0.70

-2.35

0.70

-3.22

1

0.27

-0.48

0.27

-0.8

0.27

-1.1

|

P is the parameter estimate on Price in the drilling model.
Cost
is the estimated compliance cost from the Walk, Haydel study, Farber and
Dupont (1992), and the Kerr and Associates study, respectively.
Effect
is the decrease in wildcat drilling activity associated with the
respective compliance cost estimate and price parameter.
The actual
estimate of the Price parameter is 3.357.
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numbers since these are all reductions over the number that would be
drilled in the absence of the regulations.
Table 3.10 shows the forecasting results based on the real 1990
price of oil and gas reduced by $0.70/BoE in order to examine the
effects of the regulations.

In every other respect, the forecasts in

Table 3.10 are identical to the results in Table 3.7.

By comparing

the two, it can be seen that the regulations reduce the level of
wildcat drilling, which slows the decline in the success ratio and
average size of new discoveries.

In other words, the drilling

activity is delayed and future discoveries are therefore also delayed.
Table 3.11 repeats the procedures outlined above for the drilling
model based on Equation 3.12.

By comparing this table with Table 3.8,

one can see how this model predicts that the regulations will affect
drilling in south Louisiana.

The same broad conclusions apply, namely

that the drilling activity and discovery is delayed.

7. Summary and Conclusions
Two different approaches to modelling oil and gas drilling
activity in coastal south Louisiana have been utilized.

Both of these

models provide broadly similar results, and it appears that wildcat
drilling is fairly insensitive to the price of oil and gas.

The

drilling models in combination with a discovery process model form an
overall model that can be used to forecast future levels of wildcat
drilling activity.

These forecasts indicate that drilling activity

will continue to decline even if real oil and gas prices are constant.
This may result from the fact that the study area (coastal south
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TABLE 3.10
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING WITH REGULATIONS
Model Calibrated to 1987

YEAR

WELLS

NEW FIELDS

SUCCESS

SIZE

1991

65

5

0.085

251460

1992

64

6

0.084

251363

1993

64

5

0.083

251268

1994

64

5

0.082

251173

1995

64

5

0.082

251079

1996

64

5

0.081

250985

1997

64

5

0.080

250893

1998

63

5

0.080

250801

1999

63

5

0.079

250710

2000

63

5

0.078

250619

2001

63

5

0.078

250529

NOTES: New Fields is the predicted number of new fields to be found,
rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the success ratio of
drilling (the predicted number of new fields before rounding divided by
the predicted number of exploratory wells); Size is the average size of
predicted new fields; Wells is the predicted number of wildcat
exploratory wells.
The actual real 1990 price of oil and gas less
compliance costs ($11.86/BoE) and the actual 1990 AAA corporate bond
interest rate were used for each year.
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TABLE 3.11
FORECAST OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING WITH REGULATIONS
MacAvoy and Pindyck Model Calibrated to 1987

YEAR

WELLS

NEW FIELDS

SUCCESS

SIZE

1991

85

7

0.084

251396

1992

84

7

0.083

251271

1993

84

7

0.082

251147

1994

84

7

0.081

251023

1995

85

7

0.081

250901

1996

84

6

0.080

250779

1997

84

7

0.079

250658

1998

84

6

0.078

250538

1999

84

7

0.077

250419

2000

84

6

0.076

250301

2001

84

6

0.075

250183

NOTES: New Fields is the predicted number of new fields to be found,
rounded to the nearest whole number; Success is the success ratio of
drilling (the predicted number of new fields before rounding divided by
the predicted number of exploratory wells); Size is the average size of
predicted new fields; Wells is the predicted number of wildcat
exploratory wells.
The actual real 1990 price of oil and gas less
compliance costs ($11.86/BoE), the actual real 1990 Avgcost ($1229786)
and the actual 1990 AAA corporate bond interest rate were used for each
forecast year.
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Louisiana) has been thoroughly explored and it is assumed that only
small fields remain to be found and developed.
The proposed regulations would impose costs on firms engaged in
the petroleum industry, and these costs would reinforce these trends.
The drilling will be spread farther into the future, as would the
discovery of new fields and the corresponding production from those
fields.

CHAPTER 4
PRODUCTION

1. Introduction
Regulatory changes, as well as tax and price changes, can affect
the production of oil and gas in three ways: the rate at which oil and
gas is produced may be altered, the productive life of a well or field
may be changed, or in the case of newly discovered oil whether the
field is developed.

This chapter will address all three issues and

attempt to develop models that explain producing firms' responses to
costly new regulations.

2. Models of Production from Existing Fields
There are essentially two types of models that seek to describe
the rate of production of hydrocarbons from a reservoir.

First are

the geophysical (engineering) models, pioneered by M. King Hubbert in
1962.

These models explain oil production solely on the basis of

engineering concepts and ignore any economic or regulatory variables.
Production is modelled as rising quickly to a peak level, followed by
a long decline in production rates as the natural drive mechanism
slowly loses its energy.

These models focus on estimating the decline

rate and estimate ultimate production from a field or well as a
function of that decline rate.
In response to changes in the oil industry in the early 1970's,
economists unleashed a flood of oil models (see, eg, MIT Energy
Laboratory,

1974 and National Petroleum Council, 1971).
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These models
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stood on the premise (whether explicit or implicit) that oil prices
reflect all relevant data.

Kaufmann (1991) reports that these models

performed very poorly and in general tended to overestimate the
response of oil supply to changes in oil price.

More recent

econometric models of oil supply and production do not seem to have
improved matters much (see Hall, et al., 1986).
Kaufmann (1991) attempts to combine the engineering and
econometric models by arguing that geophysical factors impose severe
constraints on a firm's ability to respond to economic variables.

He

calculates a "natural" decline rate using a model developed by Hubbert
(1962), and then calculates what production would have been each year
had production declined at that "natural" rate.

Then he finds the

difference between actual production and the calculated production,
and proposes that this residual represents the response of oil
production to changes in economic and political variables.

It is the

residual (not the actual production level) which is explained by
prices and other variables.
Kaufmann uses Equation 4.1 to describe the "natural" decline
rate (Kaufmann, 1991, p. 114):

4.1)

I n [ { Q j Q t ) -1]

= In a - b ( C - t 0)

where Q,, is the (separately estimated) ultimate production of oil, Q t
is the cumulative production at time t, and tQ is the start date of
production.

Given an estimate of this equation, it is possible to

backcast annual production at the "natural" decline rate noting that Q t
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is cumulative production.

The difference between this estimated

backcast production and the actual production is R t, the residual at
time t.

Kaufmann models the residual as follows:

4.2) R t

=

a + P^Pod^,)

+ P 2 (P0<3.4.5)> + P 3 (Po/Pg) + P 4 ( T R 0 + P 5 ( A e t)

in which PQ(1 2) and Po(3 4 5) are the average real price of oil 1 and 2
years ago and 3, 4, and 5 years ago respectively.

P0/Pg is the ratio

of the real price of oil and the real price of natural gas. Using
Texas as the source of his observations, TRC represents the fraction
of production capacity shut in by the Texas Railroad Commission.

AQt

is the first difference of the backcast production after the peak but
zero before the peak.

Kaufmann uses this variable to test the

symmetry of the backcast production curve.
An alternative specification to Equation 4.2 is one that
recognizes Hotelling's (1931) analysis of natural resource production.
Hotelling argued that the expected change in price net of production
costs (net price) and the expected interest rate would jointly
influence the production of a natural resource such as oil.

The

Hotelling model tells us that the real (net) price of oil will rise at
the rate of interest, assuming a perfectly competitive industry, no
rule of capture, no uncertainty, and constant demand.

If the

percentage change in real net price of oil (%APQ) is greater than the
real interest rate (I), a decrease in production is expected as firms
leave the oil in the ground awaiting the higher future prices.
< I, firms will increase production,

increasing current revenues

If %AP0
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(relative to future revenues at lower prices) and earning the
relatively higher rate of interest.

A Hotelling variable is created

by taking the difference between the percentage change in the real
price of oil and the real interest rate.
Hotelling's theory.

It is possible to test

For this reason, the following alternative

specification was tested:

4.3)
R t = f(%AP0-I)
where R t > 0 if (%AP0-J) < 0
R t < 0 if (%APe-J) > 0
R t = 0 if ( %A P e- J ) = 0

Hotelling's thesis
rates

and the

can

also be tested by using the actual production

same explanatory variable on the right hand side.

Finally, a piece-wise continuous form of Equation 4.3 can be
tested wherein the dependent variable is the residual and the
independent variable is the natural log of the absolute value of the
Hotelling variable multiplied by a dummy variable equal to 1 when the
Hotelling variable is positive and 0 otherwise plus the natural log of
the absolute value of the Hotelling variable multiplied by a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the Hotelling variable is negative and zero
otherwise.

The sign of the parameters is expected to be negative when

the Hotelling variable is positive and positive
variable is negative.

when the Hotelling

However, the response of producers may be

asymmetric in that it is no doubt easier to lower production than to
raise production.

For that reason, it is expected that more

parameters will be significant when the Hotelling variable is positive
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than when it is negative.

Unfortunately, without knowing what

producers' price expectations were at the time that these production
decisions were being made, the percentage changes in actual historical
prices were used in calculating the Hotelling variables.
The best test of Hotelling's theory would take into account
producer price expectations.

Therefore, a model was tested in which

the Hotelling variable was constructed using future prices as if
producers knew with perfect foresight what oil prices would be next
period.

The parameter estimates obtained

were significant in some

cases, primarily for the medium to large fields.

This type of model

is obviously not useful for forecasting purposes is mentioned here
only to illustrate that expectations do play a role in producer firm
decision making.
Hotelling's comparative statics indicate that an expected
increase in the cost of production which will reduce net price will
cause production to increase (since the higher production costs will
cause %AP0 to fall below I).

If the increase in production cost is

expected to be temporary and the net price is expected to return to
current real levels over time, the current net price will fall
relative to future net price causing %AP0 > I and a decrease in current
production.

However,

if the increase in production costs and the

corresponding fall in net price is a one time discrete change, this
will not affect the percentage change in net price and thus will not
affect production rates at all.
One serious problem with Kaufmann's approach is the use of an
estimated "natural" decline rate.

The firm has some influence over
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the decline rate through decisions about initial capital investment in
a field or well.

A larger investment in the field will lead to a

higher initial capacity and a higher decline rate (production will
fall more quickly from one period to the next).

Two factors will

mitigate the tendency for the firm to produce the oil as quickly as
possible.

The marginal cost of initial capacity is increasing, but

additionally (and more importantly) the more quickly a field or well
is produced (ie, the higher the initial capacity) the less oil that is
ultimately recovered.

Thus the firm will choose the optimal initial

capacity and simultaneously choose (within the geophysical limits
defined by the reservoir and its drive mechanism) the decline rate.
There may be no "natural" decline rate in the sense that Kaufmann
apparently uses the word.
A different approach to synthesizing the engineering and
econometric approaches is that of Camm, et al.
al.

(1990).

(1982) and Deacon, et

These studies examine the impact of new or higher state

severance taxes on oil produced in California and are very relevant to
this thesis.

Camm, et al. argue that the decline rate is fixed by the

initial capacity and that therefore production does not deviate
significantly from the path dictated by the decline rate.

Camm, et

al. do not include production as a choice variable for firms in their
model.

They reason further that even in the face of rising real oil

prices costs must rise faster than revenues, else no well or field
would ever be shut down for economic reasons.

Thus net revenues from

a field or well decline at a constant rate in their model, and the
effects of a change in the level of net price (resulting from the
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imposition of costly regulations, for instance) will affect production
only in the choice of the period in which the well or field will be
shut down.

The change will not affect the rate of production in Camm,

et al.'s model.10
If decline rates are fixed by the choice of initial capacity, as
asserted by Camm, et al. and Deacon, et al., then changes in the net
price of oil will only affect the minimum economic field size and the
shut down point (discussed in the following Section) but not the rate
at which oil is produced from existing fields.

If, on the other hand,

the extracting firm has control over the decline rate, then changes in
the real net price of oil will affect production from current on-line
w e l l s.

This question of whether or not decline rates of on-line wells

(ie, production rates) respond to changes in economic variables is
testable empirically.
In addition to Equation 4.2 and the two forms of Equation 4.3,
two other specifications of firm production decisions can be tested.
First, actual production could be specified as a function of the three
price variables which appear in Equation 4.2.

In addition, actual

production could be specified as a function of the current real price
of oil.

These five specifications generally stem from the assumption

that firms adjust their output (production) in response to price
changes (or changes in net price) in order to maximize profits.

10 Note that the Hotelling model suggests that production is
affected only by changes in net price, not the absolute price (except
when the absolute price falls so low that the decision is made to shut
in a well or when it rises so high that no sales are made). In this
very narrow sense, the model of Camm, et al. follows the Hotelling
m o del.
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3. Models of Field Development and Shut Down Decisions
There are several major approaches to determining the firm's
shut down point and the related question of the minimum size of a
field which may be profitably developed (the minimum economic field
size).

That these two issues are the same is clear when it is

considered that for a field which is not sufficiently large to
profitably develop, the shut down time is identical to the initial
period.

A well or field is shut down (or shut in) if production

ceases.

However, this is not the same as abandonment.

Abandonment is

a permanent destruction of a well, usually by plugging it with cement
and removing all surface equipment.

A firm can shut in a well for a

period of time and then restart production at a later date, but this
appears to be a relatively rare event.

Clarke and Reed (1990) point

out that the shut down decision is quite complex and the outcome is
dependent on the firm's expectations of future prices.

Clarke and

Reed develop an elegant model of the shut down decision11, but are
unable to carry out any empirical work because of the data
requirements of their model.12
A simpler model of the shut down decision is developed by Camm,
et al. (Deacon, et al. develop a similar model).

It builds on the

results of their production model in that it is assumed that the
decline rate is partly determined by the initial investment in
capacity but that it is not sensitive to price changes.

Further, the

11 They actually develop a model of the abandonment decision, but
the shut down decision is implicit in this.
12 For further evidence of the extreme difficulty of applying
dynamic models of natural resource production, see McDonald, 1991.
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authors assume that there is some cost that is related to initial
capacity but that is not related to production (ie, a fixed cost).
Finally, they assume that production will continue so long as
"revenues net of taxes can cover annual operating costs" (Camm, et
a l . , p. 180).
In the face of some Irreducible level of uncertainty about
future prices it is reasonable to model the firm as making the
decision whether to continue production or to shut down as a discrete,
periodic decision.

Camm, et al. start by specifying current

production (in period tc) as:

4.4)

K ( t 0 ) e ' 6 < t c ' to)

where K(tQ) is initial capacity, ft is the decline rate and tQ is the
initial production date.

Now, revenue net of production related costs

and taxes i s :

4 .5) p - K ( t 0 ) e 'M t c '£o)

where p is the price net of production related costs and taxes, and
other variables are defined as before.
time tc when:

Production continues until

67

4.6) (p-e"Mtc"to) - 2>0)

t0) = 0

where bQ are non-production related, but non-sunk, fixed costs measured
in dollars per barrel of initial capacity and other variables are
defined as before.
By examining Equation 4.6 it can be shown that the change in the
productive life of a field is represented by the following
relationship,

4.7) T'-T = -iinfwEo
5

p

where net price changes from p to p' and field life changes from T to
T' (Camm, et al., p. 182).

Equation 4.7 will lead to estimates of the

change in productive life of any given field in the face of a change
in the price of oil.
The assumption of price exogeneity allows a calculation of the
profit maximizing firm's shut down point and thus leads to a
calculation of lost production due to the regulations.

The firm will

continue to produce oil until the price of the oil is equal to the
marginal cost of production.

Since the production by an individual

firm in coastal south Louisiana is assumed to have no effect on the
price of oil we have only to estimte the marginal cost.

This is done

by calculating the direct operating costs for future years based on
the estimated cost function (see Section 4.4).

For each year, the

operating cost is the increase in total cost of producing the field
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while the production is the increase in total output from the field.
The marginal cost for the year's production is derived by dividing
these two.
Since the costs are steadily increasing and production is
steadily decreasing, it is seen that the marginal cost is increasing
from year to year.

This is due primarily to the effect of depletion;

each barrel of oil is more costly to extract than the previous one.
However, readers should keep in mind that several assumptions are
being made here.

It is assumed that the marginal costs are constant

for each year and only change from one year to the next rather than
being a smoothly continuous function.

This implies that the results

of the procedure just outlined will only provide an upper bound on the
lost production volume.

For instance, if the calculated marginal cost

is $18 in one year and $22 the next and the price is assumed to be $20
per barrel (all in constant dollars), we can say that production will
continue through the first year but will not take place in the second
year.

With the regulations in place at an estimated cost of $0.70 per

barrel, the upper bound on the lost production is the production from
the first year even though we still predict production to continue
through the first year but not the second.
precise estimates of lost production.

The model cannot provide

In addition, no enhanced oil

recovery is allowed in the model.
To calculate the minimum economic field size and its sensitivity
to changes in net price, it is recalled that firms wish to maximize
the net present value (NPV) of production from a field.
production can be expressed in the following form:

The NPV of
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T

T

4 .8 ) N P V = -SC + Po'K'f e~(r**~K)tdt - OC' j e~lr~c)tdt
0

0

where SC are sunk costs (drilling expenses and production equipment),
PQ is the real 1987 price of oil, K is the initial production level, r
is the interest rate, 8 is the decline rate, tc is the rate of real
price increase, OC are annual real operating costs and c is the annual
rate of increase of real operating costs.
the field.

T is the expected life of

If the NPV is negative no production will take place.

By

setting NPV equal to zero and solving for K we get minimum economic
field size.

4. Data and Data Sources
Data used in this chapter are summarized in Table 4.1.

The data

run from 1953 to 1987 giving 35 observations unless otherwise noted.
Annual data were used because much of it is not available on any other
basis.
Annual production from selected fields was obtained from the
1953 through 1987 editions of Annual Oil and Gas Report.

A

description of how the ultimate production of oil for individual
fields was estimated can be found in Chapter 3.

The time variable

used in Equation 4.1 is simply a column of index numbers.
The economic variables were obtained from Louisiana Energy
Statistics. 1909-1989.

These prices were adjusted for inflation using

the GNP deflator (obtained from Citibase).

The interest rate is the

AAA corporate bond rate (also obtained from Citibase), which was also
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TABLE 4.1
PRODUCTION MODELS DATA SUMMARY

VARIABLE

MEAN

RESIDUAL

DESCRIPTION
Difference between production
estimated using "natural"
decline rate and actual
production

PRODUCTION

Annual production

TIME

Years of production between
1953 and 1987

PRICE, §2

$15.74

Two year running average of
net real price of oil

p r i c e 35

$14.53

Running average of net real
oil price 3, 4, and 5 years
previous

O/G PRICE

3.11

Hotelling variable; equal to
percent change in net price
less the real interest rate

HOTEL

PRICE

Ratio of real oil to real
natural gas price

$16.03

net real price of oil; south
Louisiana onshore, at wellhead
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adjusted to real values.

In every case, the prices used are the

wellhead price in south Louisiana.
Production cost data are only available from 1976 (see Deacon,
1993).

The available data were obtained directly from Mr. Ralph

Russell of the Dallas field office of the Department of Energy's
Energy Information Administration.

A cost series from 1953 to 1987

was constructed by regressing the natural logarithm of the available
cost data against an index.

The available cost data are in the form

of four series (one for each of four depths) of average annual direct
operating costs for a coastal south Louisiana oil field with 10
producing wells.

This was converted to a cost per barrel of oil basis

by dividing the annual cost by the annual oil production from the
fields used in the study.

This resulted in an average production cost

of $0.50/bbl, with a high of $9.76/bbl and a low of $0.12/bbl (all
using 1987 cost and production data).

The high value resulted from a

field which had very little production in 1987.
Only recently has the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources
begun to keep statistics on the number of wells active in fields, so
it was not possible to adjust this cost series to reflect different
numbers of operating wells in the fields in the study.

However,

average production depths for the fields in the study were obtained
from the Production Audit Reporting System (PARS) and the appropriate
cost series was used based on the average producing depth for each
field.
Field level data were used rather than less aggregrated data
because of problems encountered obtaining and utilizing lease level
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production reports.

The lease level data are not as complete as the

field level data, particularly for periods preceding 1978.

In

general, relationships not observed at the field level are not
expected to be observable at a more disaggregated level.
Sunk costs of production were obtained from the DOE-EIA
publication Costs and Indices for Domestic Oil and Gas Field Equipment
and Production Operations. 1987 through 1989.

5. Empirical Results
Equation 4.1 was estimated for thirteen fields in south
Louisiana, selected from various areas and the seven largest class
sizes (see Chapter 3).

Fields from smaller class sizes were not

selected because, for many of them, their productive lives were so
short that considerably fewer than 35 years of data exist.

As it is,

several of the fields actually used in the estimate ceased production
before 1987.
in Table 4.2.

The results of these thirteen regressions are presented
The regressions were run using a two period

autoregressive model.
Note that in every case the intercept parameter and the
parameter on the TIME variable (ie, the decline rate) are significant
at the 0.01 level.

These results should be viewed with some caution

since the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate that the hypothesis that
autocorrelation is present cannot be rejected despite the use of a
second order autoregressive model.
In order to obtain net prices, it is necessary to obtain a real
operating cost series.

This was done using a log-linear equation as
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TABLE 4.2
RESULTS OF EQUATION 4.1 FOR SELECTED FIELDS

*

FIELD NAME

INTERCEPT
(t RATIO)

TIME
(t RATIO)

DU

REG R2

TOTAL
R2

LAFITTE

3.424
(18.546)*

-0.135
(-15.95)*

1.104

0.888

0.989

BELL ISLE

3.831
(13.071)*

-0.183
(-13.65)*

1.076

0.854

0.988

AVERY ISLAND

2.461
(11.451)*

-0.110
(-10.99)*

0.998

0.791

0.971

DEER ISLAND

3.929
(12.291)*

-0.191
(-12.52)*

1.327

0.831

0.938

BLACK BAY SE

6.607
(19.423)*

-0.282
(-17.37)*

1.235

0.904

0.968

CONSTANCE
BAYOU

6.302
(2.986)*

-0.554
(-5.93)*

1.495

0.524

0.959

BAYOU SALE

3.051
(12.848)*

-0.136
(-12.72)*

1.084

0.835

0.989

JEANERETTE

2.678
(10.848)*

-0.108
(-9.41)*

1.109

0.735

0.967

POINTE A LA
HACHE

1.942
(11.949)*

-0.104
(-13.55)*

1.109

0.852

0.972

LAKE LONG

2.678
(11.233)*

-0.099
(-9.01)*

1.102

0.718

0.966

BOUTTE

3.858
(12.428)*

-0.196
(-13.58)*

1.166

0.852

0.980

HOUMA SOUTH

3.621
(15.304)*

-0.156
(-11.44)*

1.101

0.840

0.974

BAYOU PEROT

2.009
(10.773)*

-0.072
(-6.68)*

0.950

0.641

0.919

Denotes significance at the 0.01 level.

DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic after data transformation.
REG R2 is the R2 for the structural part of the model (ie, excluding
the autoregressive parameters).
TOTAL R2 is the R2 for the total model, including the autoregressive
parameters.
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described in Section 4.4.

These regressions were also run using a two

period autoregressive model.

The results are shown in Table 4.3.

Note that the intercepts are significant at the 0.01 level in all four
series, while the parameters on the index are in no case significant.
These parameters were used to create four series of costs from 1953
through 1987.

The absence of significance on the index parameters

suggests that the reliability of the constructed cost series is low.
This may affect the estimates of models that use this series.
The estimated decline rates (Table 4.2) were used to backcast
production (as described in Section 4.2).

The difference between

actual and backcast production (the residual, R t) was used as the
dependent variable for two different regressions for each of the
thirteen fields.

The explanatory variables used are given in the

text, except that neither the TRC variable nor the first difference of
the backcast production was used.

Kaufmann used the first difference

of the backcast production as a test of the symmetry of his model, not
as an explanatory variable.

Louisiana had no system of production

allowables similar to that of the Texas Railroad Commission.

The

exact form of the relationships is not known, so a linear model was
used in each case, following Kaufmann.

Thus for each field five

different regression results are reported.
using a two period autoregressive model.

Each regression was run
These results are presented

in Tables 4.4(a) through 4.4(m).
Eight of the fields in this study exhibit at least one price
parameter that is significant using a one tail t-test.

One tail tests

were utilized since there are very strong theoretical reasons for
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TABLE 4.3
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COST FUNCTION

DEPTH

INTERCEPT
(t RATIO)

INDEX
(t RATIO)

DW

REG R2

TOTAL
R2

2000'

11.6327
(74.20)*

0.0148
(0.63)

2.998

0.053

0.875

4000'

11.9941
(93.21)*

0.0146
(0.74)

2.898

0.072

0.942

8000'

12.1704
(68.60)*

0.0076
(0.31)

2.868

0.011

0.916

12000'

12.3581
(85.91)*

0.0225
(1.03)

2.859

0.130

0.880

* denotes significance at the 0.01 level. Note that the dependent
variable is the natural logarithm of the direct operating cost for each
depth classification.
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TABLE 4.4(a)
LAFITTE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RES ID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT
(t ratio)

-115918
(-0.026)

-1E+6
(-0.40)

6560521
(2.202)**

4455829
(2.28)**

4769664
(2.57)**

PRICE, 2
(t ratio)

-5787
(-0.078)

-24156
(-0.39)

PRICEj 5
(t ratio)

-50175
(-0.376)

-90704
(-0.95)

0/G PRICE
(t ratio)

115215
(0.423)

32193
(0.12)

HOTEL
(t ratio)

296954
(0.60)

308293
(0.624)

PRICE
(t ratio)

-8395
(-0.027)

DW

2.434

2.180

2.206

2.347

2.198

REG R2

0.021

0.013

0.042

0.014

0.003

TOTAL R2

0.967

0.967

0.955

0.954

0.953

In this and the following sub-tables,
below will be used.

the conventions described

*** denotes significance at the 0.01 level,

denotes significance at the 0.05 level,
denotes significance at the 0.10 level.
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic after transformation.
REG R2 is the R2 for the structural part of the model (ie, excluding
the autoregressive parameters).
TOTAL R2 is the R2 for the total m o d e l , including the autoregressive
parameters.
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TABLE 4.4(b)
BELL ISLE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RES ID

RES ID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

160618
(0.19)

-68342
(-0.17)

1593251
(2.22)**

805143
(1.91)*

834903
(1.93)**

PRICE, 2

-6379
(-0.37)

-16999
(-1.04)

PRICEjg

4473
(0.20)

-12357
(-0.59)

O/G PRICE

-61659
(-0.81)

-94075
(-1.24)

HOTEL

-75071
(-0.52)

-70772
(-0.49)

PRICE

-3596
(-0.41)

DW

2.090

2.108

2.244

2.177

2.191

REG R2

0.031

0.001

0.071

0.009

0.006

TOTAL R2

0.933

0.932

0.925

0.919

0.920
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TABLE 4.4(c)
AVERY ISLAND OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RES ID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

-253891
(-0.000)

136301
(0.064)

-172177
(-0.00)

1896443
(1.81)*

1489429
(0.84)

PRICE, 2

24334
(0.780)

18891
(0.58)

PRICE3(5

66979
(1.37)*

59388
(1.06)

O/G PRICE

193291
(1.027)

114502
(0.60)

HOTEL

192948
(0.49)

188470
(0.493)

26639
(1.20)

PRICE
DW

1.790

1.739

1.754

1.764

1.857

REG R2

0.203

0.010

0.095

0.010

0.057

TOTAL R2

0.908

0.885

0.843

0.824

0.838
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TABLE 4.4(d)
DEER ISLAND OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RESID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

-201157
(-1.23)

-3785
(-0.05)

189043
(1.18)

215344
(3.67)” *

243954
(3.58)***

p r i c e 12

6471
(1•74)**

3461
(0.89)

PRICER

1555
(0.33)

-3119
(-0.64)

O/G PRICE

23174
(0.92)

3694
(0.14)

HOTEL

51433
(0.95)

56617
(1.04)

PRICE

-1726
(-0.58)

DW

1.992

2.020

1.938

1.911

1.934

REG R2

0.110

0.031

0.039

0.037

0.012

TOTAL R2

0.777

0.756

0.689

0.677

0.680
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TABLE 4.4(e)
BLACK BAY SE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RESID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

|

INTERCEPT

-592439
(-0.52)

-39197
(-0.19)

190478
(0.22)

438240
(0.95)

528676
(1.16)

1

PRICE, 2

10303
(0.84)

4156
(0.33)

PRICER

25141
(1.52)**

18417
(1.10)

O/G PRICE

-18598
(-0.30)

-42218
(-0.66)

HOTEL

-189612
(-1.69)

-175320
(-1.57)

PRICE

-4901
(-0.67)

DW

1.926

2.113

2.198

2.134

2.041

REG R2

0.144

0.093

0.079

0.081

0.015

TOTAL R2

0.872

0.870

0.927

0.926

0.924
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TABLE 4.4(f)
CONSTANCE BAYOU OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RESID

INTERCEPT

82628
(0.80)

PRICE, 2

16942
(1.13)

19491
(1.53)*

PRICER

-16948
(-1.13)

-19496
(-1.53)

O/G PRICE

-27373
(-1.10)

-37084
(-1.55)

HOTEL

|

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

-17545
(-0.52)

167722
(1.33)

67632
(1.10)

54497
(1.44)

167
(0.42)

297
(0.49)

PRICE

4
(0.16)

DW

2.444

2.363

1.962

1.671

2.056

REG R2

0.113

0.009

0.201

0.012

0.001

TOTAL R2

0.779

0.774

0.704

0.662

0.655
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TABLE 4.4(g)
BAYOU SALE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RESID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

598830
(0.19)

-420550
(-0.21)

5787811
(2.38)'®*

3643223
(2.15)*®

3811335
(2.33)**

PRICE, >2

4215
(0.08)

-14168
(-0.30)

PRICEj^

-63399
(-0.65)

-106848
(-1.27)

O/G PRICE

60233
(0.34)

27041
(0.16)

HOTEL

135895
(0.41)

140144
(0.43)

PRICE

-5872
(-0.29)

DW

2.417

2.237

2.286

2.304

2.284

REG R2

0.045

0.006

0.088

0.006

0.003

TOTAL R2

0.980

0.980

0.976

0.975

0.975
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TABLE 4.4(h)
JEANERETTE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RESID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

-413975
(-0.00)

-74318
(-0.08)

682403
(0.55)

748484
(1.37)

788904
(1.28)

PRICE, >2

3227
(0.22)

-2640
(-0.20)

PRICE^j

15980
(0.84)

6833
(0.42)

O/G PRICE

12837
(0.21)

878
(0.01)

HOTEL

20952
(0.19)

19840
(0.19)

PRICE

-141
(-0.02)

DW

2.111

1.918

2.190

1.990

2.238

REG R2

0.046

0.001

0.017

0.001

0.000

TOTAL R2

0.969

0.967

0.945

0.944

0.944
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TABLE 4.4(i)
POINTE A LA HACHE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT || RESID

RESID

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

4E+8
(0.03)

859567
(0.30)

3215983
(0.00)

1192756
(0.00)

PRICE, 2

10046
(0.76)

5305
(0.65)

PRICEj^

14346
(0.68)

4526
(0.35)

O/G PRICE

93122
(1.51)*

87652
(2.24)**

HOTEL

51641
(0.70)

|

PROD
1057224
(0.00)

50067
(0.65)

PRICE

2421
(0.52)

DW

1.954

2.536

1.745

2.351

1.992

REG R2

0.258

0.017

0.216

0.016

0.010

TOTAL R2

0.919

0.948

0.960

0.943

0.954
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TABLE 4 .4(j)
LAKE LONG OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

||

RESID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

4E+7
(0.00)

-61345
(-0.09)

285942
(0.03)

281694
(1.26)

273844
(0.56)

p r i c e 1>2

987
(0.32)

578
(0.20)

PRICE j 5

2457
(0.64)

2454
(0.68)

O/G PRICE

-7915
(-0.38)

-14427
(-0.72)

HOTEL

-3756
(-0.69)

-3594
(-0.65)

PRICE

2001
(0.96)

DW

1.828

1.880

2.054

1.822

2.109

REG R2

0.137

0.017

0.044

0.015

0.032

TOTAL R2

0.974

0.973

0.945

0.945

0.944
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TABLE 4.4(k)
BOUTTE OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

||

RESID

RESID

PROD

PROD

PROD

INTERCEPT

-336757
(-2.1)**

-4221
(-0.07)

103705
(0.61)

210194
(4.27)***

244084
(3.71)***

p r i c e 1<2

4819
(0.94)

330
(0.06)

PRICE j 5

5061
(0.80)

-299
(-0.04)

O/G PRICE

61483
(2.19)**

30960
(1.04)

HOTEL

43959
(0.70)

45587
(0.73)

PRICE

-2560
(-0.74)

DW

2.110

1.962

2.113

2.026

2.096

REG R2

0.162

0.019

0.046

0.017

0.018

TOTAL R2

0.774

0.740

0.701

0.688

0.691

87
TABLE 4.4(1)
HOUMA SOUTH OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

I

RESID

| RESID

PROD

PROD

-21742
(-0.61)

104675
(11.62)***

73937
(2.38)**

INTERCEPT

-365139
(-0.27)

PRICE, 2

11016
(3.06)***

838
(0.26)

PRICE j s

17835
(4.03)***

14245
(3.80)***

O/G PRICE

9415
(1.59)*

-2635
(-0.70)

HOTEL

-26586
(-0.41)

PROD

4579
(0.24)

10107
(0.54)

PRICE

2982
(0.98)

DW

2.047

1.717

1.985

2.005

1.823

REG R2

0.595

0.014

0.529

0.003

0.042

TOTAL R2

0.971

0.932

0.747

0.491

0.573
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TABLE 4.4(m)
BAYOU PEROT OIL FIELD REGRESSION RESULTS

DEPENDENT

RESID

RESID

INTERCEPT

-17179
(-0.08)

803049
(0.27)

PRICE1,2

1428
(0.33)

1442
(0.33)

PRICEjg

-1423
(-0.32)

-1435
(-0.33)

O/G PRICE

12934
(1.60)*

13519
(1.69)*

HOTEL

|

PROD

PROD

PROD

58116
(0.62)

323073
(0.88)

135688
(0.68)

281
(0.79)

281
(0.81)

PRICE

-1147
(-0.36)

DW

1.892

2.396

1.833

1.921

1.766

REG R2

0.116

0.031

0.127

0.029

0.006

TOTAL R2

0.968

0.969

0.952

0.949

0.946

|
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believing that the price parameters are positive (ie, that production
should increase given an increase in prices).

In general, only the

smaller fields had any significant price parameters.

This may

indicate that smaller fields (with less production) are more sensitive
to price changes than are the more productive larger fields.

Note

that none of the parameters on the Hotelling variables (in this case
constructed using past price changes as a proxy for expected future
price changes) are significant using a one tail t-test.
For each significant price parameter an elasticity was
calculated using average values for both the dependent and independent
variables.

The derivative of R t with respect to Q t is equal to 1, so

for the regressions in which the residual is the dependent variable
the mean value of actual production was used in conjunction with the
parameter estimate and the elasticity was calculated in the usual
manner.

The economic interpretation does not change in this case.

For a summary of the calculated elasticities, see Table 4.5.

The

largest elasticity is 5.81, indicating a strong relationship between
price and production.

The smallest is 0.27, which indicates that

production is rather insensitive to changes in price.

The simple mean

of the elasticities in Table 4.5 is 1.24.
The piece-wise continuous form of Equation 4.3 was also run
using a two period autoregressive model but the results are reported
separately in Table 4.6.

The parameter estimates are significant in

some cases, primarily for the smaller fields in the study.

This

implies that the ability of producers to adjust output is greater in
smaller fields than in larger fields.

Consistent with expectations,
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TABLE 4.5
SELECTED ELASTICITY CALCULATIONS

FIELD

MEAN
PRODUCTION

PRODUCTION
(IND VAR)

CONSTANCE
BAYOU

52,798

5.81

POINTE A
LA HACHE

1,001,435

POINTE A
LA HACHE

91

HOUMA, S

105,011

HOUMA, S

99

HOUMA, S

91

HOUMA, S

91

RESIDUAL
(IND VAR)

<P,.2>
0.27
<PQ/G>

0.29
(P0/G>

1.97
(P3.5>

1.65
<P1.2>
2.47
(p3.5>

0.28
(p o /g )

BAYOU
PEROT

80,404

BAYOU
PEROT

91

AVERY
ISLAND

1,969,648

DEER
ISLAND

235,863

BLACK BAY
SE

664,328

BOUTTE

216,170

0.52
(P0/G^

0.50
(p q /g )

0.49
(P3.5>

0.43
<P 1.2>

0.55
^P3.5^
0.88
(P0/g )

The independent variable associated with the significant parameter
with which the elasticity calculation has been made is given in
parentheses below the reported elasticity.
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TABLE 4.6
PIECE-WISE CONTINUOUS REGRESSION

FIELD

LN H | , H>0

LAFITTE

-47742
(-0.611)

BELL ISLE

l n |h

|, H<0

DW

REG R2

TOT R2

3802
(0.075)

2.145

0.027

0.969

-16228
(-0.945)

-26070
(-1.546)

2.060

0.082

0.937

AVERY ISL

2980
(0.046)

-9759
(-0.185)

1.733

0.002

0.889

DEER ISL

-6959
(-0.519)

-6556
(-0.631)

1.997

0.014

0.755

BLACK BAY

-26070
(-2.46)**

-28578
(-1.94)*

2.200

0.178

0.883

CONSTANCE
BAYOU

-18473
(-3.20)***

-2351
(-0.712)

2.236

0.356

0.850

BAYOU SALE

3703
(0.067)

9251
(0.238)

2.240

0.003

0.980

JEANERETT

8838
(0.457)

8548
(0.486)

1.934

0.009

0.969

POINTE A
LA HACHE

-5424
(-0.441)

7940
(0.834)

2.372

0.091

0.953

LAKE LONG

-13369
(-1.89)*

-16236
(-2.18)**

1.902

0.156

0.979

BOUTTE

-20709
(-1.311)

2554
(0.223)

2.030

0.115

0.765

HOUMA S

-2190
(-1.433)

-1221
(-0.735)

1.796

0.090

0.943

BAYOU
PEROT

-3457
(-1.99)*

-2203
(-1.67)

2.606

0.198

0.976

* - Indicates significance at the 0.10 level.
* - Indicates significance at the 0.05 level.
*** - Indicates significance at the 0.01 level.
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more of the parameters on the natural log of the absolute value of the
Hotelling variable are significant when the Hotelling variable is
positive than when it is negative.

For the two significant parameters

on the independent variable when the Hotelling variable is negative,
the sign is not the expected sign.
The change in the productive life of a field can be quantified
using Equation 4.7.

The estimated decline rates for the thirteen

fields studied here are given in Table 4,2 (the parameter estimates on
the TIME variable).

These range from a low value of -0.072 to a high

of -0.554, and the mean value is -0.179.

The average of the real oil

prices used in this study is $16.03 per barrel (see Table 4.1),
although the current wellhead price is approximately $20 per barrel.
Using the three values for the decline rate and the two values for the
price of oil, in addition to the three values of production cost per
barrel (see the previous Section) and the estimated cost of compliance
with the proposed regulations of $0.70 per barrel of oil (see Farber
and Dupont, 1992), a range of possible values can be calculated for
the change in productive life of a field in the face of these
regulations.
4.7.

The results of these calculations are shown in Table

Note that the largest calculated loss of productive life for a

field is 1.6 years.

This occurs for the lowest decline rate, lowest

price and largest production cost.

Since Equation 4.7 is structured

such that the percentage change in price is the driving factor (rather
than the absolute price or absolute change in price), the $0.70 per
barrel of oil compliance cost is calculated to have a larger impact at
lower absolute net oil prices and lower decline rates.

The production
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TABLE 4.7
LOSS OF PRODUCTIVE FIELD LIFE IN YEARS
T' - T, see Equation 4.7

Cost - $9.76/bbl
p

* - -0.072

8 - -0.179

8 - -0.554

|

$20

-0.983

-0.396

-0.128

1

$16.03

-1.644

-0.661

-0.214

|

Cost - $0.50/bbl
P

8 - -0.072

8 - -0.179

8 - -0.554

$20

-0.508

-0.204

-0.066

$16.03

-0.641

-0.258

-0.083

Cost - $0.12/bbl
P

8 - -0.072

8 - -0.179

8 - -0.554

$20

-0.498

-0.200

-0.065

$16.03

-0.625

-0.251

-0.081

T' is the life of the field after the change in net price, while
T is the initial life of the field (both in years). The initial price
is p (shown), while p' - p - $0.70 - Cost.
See the text for further
details.
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cost per barrel for these calculations was based on the reported costs
(rather than the constructed cost series) and production for 1987.
The rather large upper value obtained ($9.76/bbl) was for a field with
very little production in 1987.

The loss of 1.6 years in productive

life for such a field will have little impact on the overall
production of oil in south Louisiana.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out using the three
compliance cost estimates.

The results are in Table 4.8.

For the

lowest price, highest production cost and highest compliance cost
(Walk, Haydel's $1.13/barrel of oil estimate), the estimated loss of
productive field life is 2.8 years.

Again, this represents a field

with very little production so that the actual loss of oil production
is not likely to be significant.
The lost production calculation described in Section 4.3 was
carried out for each field in the study for which production continued
through 1987.

If a real oil price of $16.03 per barrel (the average

of the real oil prices for 1953 through 1987) is assumed then the mean
of the upper bounds on lost production volume due to the regulations
is 21,400 barrels and the median is 25,300 barrels (see Tables 4.9 and
4.10).

Of course, this production is lost at the end of the life of

the field and for 7 of the 11 fields this is after the turn of the
century.

In no case did it appear that the productive life of a field

would be shortened by more than one year.

In total, there are 421

fields in the coastal zone (see Table 3.2) which indicates that just
over 9 million barrels of oil will not be produced because of the
shortened lives of fields due to the regulations if the mean for the
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TABLE 4.8
LOSS OF PRODUCTIVE FIELD LIFE IN YEARS
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
$1.13/barrel compliance cost
p

8 « -0.072

8 - -0.179

8 - -0.554

$20

-0.83

-0.33

-0.11

$16.03

-1.05

-0.42

-0.14

$0.27/barrel compliance cost
P

8 - -0.072

8 - -0.179

8 - -0.554

$20

-0.19

-0.08

-0.03

$16.03

-0.24

-0.10

-0.03

Note: This sensitivity analysis was carried out assuming a production
cost of $0.50/barrel. It is directly comparable to the middle table in
Table 4.7 (p. 93).
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TABLE 4.9
SELECTED RESULTS FOR COST AND PRODUCTION FORECASTS

LAFITTE FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

2018

17,951

$14.93

2019

15,515

$17.40

2020

13,409

$20.29

2021

11,589

$23.65

2022

10,016

$27.58

BELL ISLE FIELD (8,000')
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

1999

18,716

$12.38

2000

15,290

$15.27

2001

12,492

$18.84

2002

10,206

$23.24

2003

8,338

$28.66

BELL ISLE FIELD (12,000')
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

1997

28,040

$13.62

1998

22,908

$17.05

1999

18,716

$21.34

2000

15,290

$26.71

2001

12,492

$33.44
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AVERY ISLAND FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

2010

35,689

$14.33

2011

31,761

$16.47

2012

28,264

$18.93

2013

25,153

$21.75

2014

22,384

$25.00

DEER ISLAND FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

1996

16,963

$13.35

1997

13,718

$16.64

1998

11,093

$20.73

1999

8,971

$25.84

2000

7,254

$32.19

BLACK BAY, SE FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

1996

14,889

$15.21

1997

10,685

$21.36

1998

7,668

$30.00

1999

5,503

$42.12

2000

3,949

$59.14

BAYOU SALE FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

2013

19,662

$13.12

2014

16,986

$15.30

2015

14,674

$17.85

2016

12,676

$20.82

2017

10,951

$24.28
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JEANERETTE FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST
-

2010

18,776

$13.43

2011

16,756

$15.16

2012

14,953

$17.12

2013

13,345

$19.33

2014

11,909

$21.82

POINT A LA HACHE FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

j

2010

35,151

$14.55

|

2011

31,506

$16.60

|

2012

28,238

$18.95

|

2103

25,310

$21.62

|

2014

22,685

$24.67

|

LAKE LONG FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

2005

17,555

$13.82

2006

15,814

$15.46

2007

14,246

$17.29

2008

12,833

$19.34

2009

11,561

$21.64

BOUTTE FIELD
YEAR

PRODUCTION (EST)

AVERAGE COST

1992

27,324

$12.49

1993

21,961

$15.89

1994

17,650

$20.22

1995

14,185

$25.73

1996

11,401

$32.75
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TABLE 4.10
SUMMARY RESULTS, LOST PRODUCTION ESTIMATES

SAMPLE

PRICE

MEAN

TOTAL

MEDIAN

TOTAL

|

FULL

$16.03

21,400

9 million

25,300

10.6 mil

1

BIG

$16.03

21,695

1.4 mil

21,665

1.4 mil

|

LITTLE

$16.03

21,063

4.1 mil

25,289

4.9 mil

I

FULL

$20.00

18,350

7.7 mil

20,400

8.6 mil

|

BIG

$20.00

18,130

1.2 mil

20,365

1.3 mil

1

LITTLE

$20.00

18,615

3.6 mil

20,991

4.0 mil

|

100
fields in the study applies to all fields.

The corresponding figure

for the median value is 10.6 million barrels.

By comparison, total

south Louisiana oil production in 1989 was over 79 million barrels
(DNR-OTA, Table II.1) and cumulative production between 1926 and 1989
was 9.4 billion barrels (Lindstedt, et a l . , p. 58).

These mean and

median figures probably will not hold for all fields since the fields
used in this study were all in the seven largest size classes.

This

was done precisely because the largest fields (while fewest in number)
contain most of the oil and the smallest fields (while numerous)
contain relatively little of the total reserves.
If a real oil price of $20 per barrel is assumed the estimated
losses are smaller.

In this case, estimated mean losses o f production

are 18,350 barrels and the median value is 20,400 barrels.

This leads

to a total estimated loss for south Louisiana of 7.7 million barrels
using the mean value and 8.6 million barrels using the median value
(see Table 4.10).

These estimates are upper bounds as explained in

the previous section and the actual losses quite possibly could be
smaller.
By dividing the sample into "big" fields (from the three largest
size classes) and "little" fields (from the next four largest size
classes) we can perform the same calculations and compare the
differences.

Assuming a price of $16.03 per barrel, the mean lost

production from "big" fields is 21,695 barrels while the mean from
"little" fields is 21,063 barrels.

There are 66 "big" fields in south

Louisiana and 193 "little" fields, so that total losses from "big"
fields are 1.4 million barrels and from "little" fields, 4.1 million
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barrels.

This translates to overall losses from the seven largest

size classes of 5.5 million barrels, compared to an overall estimated
loss from all fields of 9 million barrels.

The lost production from

the "big" fields will be much later in time than the lost production
from the "little" fields.

The corresponding median value results are

21,665 barrels lost from "big" fields and 25,289 barrels lost from
"little" fields.

The little field losses are somewhat higher because

they tend to have a higher decline rate.

Estimated total losses from

"big" fields based on the median value are 1.4 million barrels, while
"little" field losses are estimated to be 4.9 million barrels.

This

gives a total lost production estimate from the seven largest size
classes of 6.3 million barrels compared to total south Louisiana
losses of 10.6 million barrels under these assumptions.
Under the $20 per barrel price assumption, mean losses of
production are 18,130 barrels for "big" fields and 18,615 barrels for
"little" fields.

Total "big" field losses are 1.2 million barrels and

total "little" field losses are 3.6 million barrels, which sum to 4.8
million barrels.

This compares to total south Louisiana losses for

mean values under this scenario of 7.7 million barrels.

The median

"big" field losses are 20,365 barrels and median "little" field losses
are 20,991 barrels.

These give total estimated losses from "big"

fields of 1.3 million barrels and from "little" fields of 4.0 million
barrels, for a total of 5.3 million barrels.

This compares to an

estimated loss of 8.6 million barrels from all south Louisiana fields.
See Table 4.10 for a summary of these results.
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Unfortunately, because of the imprecise nature of the method
used to estimate lost production from premature shutdown it was not
possible to use this method to carry out a sensitivity analysis.
Using the Walk, Haydel estimate of compliance cost resulted in no
change in the estimated losses.

The method used is simply not

sensitive enough to detect these changes.
The HEFS calculation described in Section 4.3 was carried out
using values for the decline rate and operating cost appreciation rate
gained from other calculations in this study.

The decline rates used

were the average (8 - -0.179) and an arbitrarily chosen faster decline
rate (8 » -0.25) because this calculation concerns small fields, and
the cost appreciation rate used was the value for 8,000' wells (c 0.007).

The rate of increase in real oil prices was arbitrarily set

at zero; any positive value would tend to make the MEFS less sensitive
to price changes and thus less sensitive to the regulations.
arbitrarily chosen to be 20 years.

T was

The operating costs are averages

for a 10 well field, so they were reduced by a factor of 10 since a
very small field (the smallest field that is economically viable) will
presumably have only one well.
reported in Table 4.11.

Results of this calculation are

Using a price of $20 per barrel without

regulations and $19.30 per barrel with regulations and 8 ~ -0.179
leads to a change in HEFS of only 434 barrels per year or 3.63%.

With

the same decline rate and price at $16.03 per barrel with regulations
and $15.33 per barrel without regulations, the change is 681 barrels
per year or 4.57%.

To put this in perspective, these changes amount

to less than 1.5 barrels and 2 barrels of oil per day, respectively.
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TABLE 4.11
MINIMUM ECONOMIC FIELD SIZE CALCULATION SUMMARY

PRICE

DECLINE RATE

MEFS
(INITIAL PRODUCTION)

$20.00

-0.179

11,951

$19.30

-0.179

12,385

$16.03

-0.179

14,911

$15.33

-0.179

15,592

$20.00

-0.250

15,013

$19.30

-0.250

15,558

$16.03

-0.250

18,732

$15.33

-0.250

19,587
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Using the higher decline rate but the same prices, the resulting
changes in minimum initial capacity are 545 barrels per year (3.63%)
and 855 barrels per year (4.56%).

The absolute changes are larger but

the percentage changes are identical.

On a daily basis, these changes

are 1.5 barrels and 2.3 barrels, respectively.

See Table 4.11 for a

summary of these calculations.
A sensitivity analysis carried out on the MEFS calculation using
a different estimated compliance cost indicates that using the Walk,
Haydel estimate increases the MEFS by 7.6% when using the
$16.03/barrel mean price and 6.0% when using the $20/barrel price.
This increase will not push the MEFS into the next larger size class,
however, so the change in the loss of production due to the use of the
higher compliance cost estimate will not be dramatic.

See Table 4.12

for a summary of this sensitivity analysis.
The compliance costs used in this study are average costs that
abstract away from considerations of fixed costs versus variable
costs.

If the fixed costs are high enough to offset the quasi-rents

the producer will shut down even if the increase in the marginal cost
due to the regulations is quite low.

Because this model does not

consider this aspect of compliance costs the results will not capture
these effects if they are present.

This question of fixed and

variable cost magnitudes has implications for producer decision
making.

If, as the Walk, Haydel study assumes, producers will provide

their own capital equipment for injection of produced water, the fixed
costs would be very large and any fixed cost effect would be
important.

The Kerr and Associates study implicitly assumes that

TABLE 4.12
MINIMUM ECONOMIC FIELD SIZE CALCULATION SUMMARY
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

PRICE

DECLINE RATE

MEFS
(INITIAL PRODUCTION)

$20.00

-0.179

11,951

$18.87

-0.179

12,667

$16.03

-0.179

14,911

$14.90

-0.179

16,042

$20.00

-0.250

15,013

$18.87

-0.250

15,913

$16.03

-0.250

18,732

$14.90

-0.250

20,152

Note: This sensitivity analysis was performed assuming that the Walk,
Haydel estimated compliance cost ($1.13/barrel of oil) is the true
compliance cost.
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producers will use commercial disposal facilities and that the cost
will be preponderantly variable with very low fixed costs.

In that

case, the fixed cost effect would be insignificant.

6 . Summary and Conclusions
Two approaches to modeling oil production have been examined.
The traditional econometric technique downplays the geophysical
aspects of oil production and emphasizes the response of firms to
changes in economic variables (primarily price).

The engineering

approach takes the opposite tack, in most cases ignoring economic
variables altogether.

An attempt has been made in this chapter to

synthesize the two views.
The results of the empirical work suggest that economic
variables, while playing a significant role in decisions about whether
or not a field should be developed and when a field should be shut
down, for the most part have little effect on decisions about how much
oil will be produced each period from a producing field.

The weak

significance of the estimated parameters on economic variables for the
large fields in the regression results reported in Tables 4.4(a)
through 4.4(m) lead to the conclusion that net price does not
significantly influence production levels.
the work of Camm, et al. and Deacon, et al.

This is consistent with
However, the results of

Table 4.4 indicates that price does have some influence on output
decisions in smaller fields.

Additionally, the piece-wise regressions

using the Hotell variables indicate that for some fields this
relationship is significant.

These results are mixed.
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The elasticity calculations in Table 4.5 are also mixed.

Nine

of the relationships are indicated to be inelastic while only four are
indicated to be elastic.

However, one of the relationships is found

to be extremely elastic.
Net price does play a role in the shut down decision and it does
influence minimum economic field size.

However, Table 4.7 indicates

that the shut down time will be brought forward only marginally, by as
much as 19 months or less (out of a total productive life that can run
from 20 to 30 years), if the net price of oil received by producers
falls by $0.70 per barrel due to regulations.

The lost production

volumes are estimated to be 10.6 million barrels in a worst case
scenario.

These results suggest that small price changes and the

imposition of the proposed regulations will have very little effect on
the production of oil from existing wells in coastal south Louisiana.
Net price also plays a role in the determination of whether or
not a field of a given size will be developed.

The results in Table

4.11 show that the produced waters regulations will have an effect on
the minimum economic field size of as little as 2.5 barrels per day
initial production.

CHAPTER 5
OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has analyzed and quantified the economic
effects of proposed produced waters discharge regulations.

Produced

waters are those fluids brought to the surface when oil is produced,
and have been shown to harm marine life when disposed into inland
waters and swamps.

This study has not attempted to estimate either

the economic value of the harm done by surface disposal of untreated
produced waters or the economic benefits of oil and gas activity.
Proposed regulations would require producers of oil to either treat
the produced waters before surface disposal or to inject the untreated
produced waters into underground formations.

Complying with the

regulations will increase the costs of production.

The present

analysis has been carried out by modelling the oil industry in coastal
south Louisiana and incorporating the cost of compliance with the
regulations into the model.
The oil industry participates in two broad phases of activities.
Exploration is the process of looking for deposits of oil, primarily
by drilling exploratory wells (including wildcat wells).

Once a

deposit of oil has been found that can profitably be developed and
produced, production begins.

These are very broad categorizations but

they capture the most important aspects of oil industry activity.
Correspondingly, this study has been divided into two analyses: a
study of the exploration activity of firms, and a study of the
production of oil from existing fields.
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This dissertation also
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estimates how the regulations will affect the decision whether or not
to develop a field and the related decision of when to shut down a
producing field.
The exploration analysis was further broken down into two
related objectives.

The first objective was to estimate how various

explanatory variables impact the number of wildcat wells drilled in a
year.

Two different models were used, both based on an objective

function which firms engaged in oil exploration are assumed to
maximize.

The second objective was to estimate the number and size of

remaining undiscovered oil fields in the study area.

This was modeled

by making the widely accepted assumption that fields are distributed
log normally by size in a geologically homogeneous region.

By

dividing known fields into size classes, one can draw conclusions
about the remaining fields in the region which are undiscovered.
The two models for the objectives in the exploratory drilling
section can be used together recursively.

In this way, it is possible

to use as explanatory variables in the wildcat drilling model the
wellhead price of oil and gas, the expected success rate for drilling
based on the estimate of the number of remaining undiscovered fields
and an estimate of finding rates relative to the cumulative number of
wildcat wells, and the size of the fields expected to be found (also
based on the model for the second objective).

This recursive

procedure allows both economic theory and variables and geological
factors to be analyzed simultaneously, and a much richer model of
exploratory activity is obtained.
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The empirical estimates of the parameters on the explanatory
variables in the exploratory model indicate that the impact of the
regulations will be slight.

However, the presence of

multicollinearity requires that this conclusion be advanced
cautiously.

More definitive statements about the regulatory impact

cannot be made until such time as more and better data is available.
The estimated net price elasticity of wildcat drilling is 0.279 using
the mean values of the price and wildcat drilling variables over all
years in the sample.
The estimated parameters were used to forecast future wildcat
drilling activity.

These forecasts show that wildcat drilling

activity will continue to decline in coastal south Louisiana under
current economic and technological conditions even in the absence of
new regulations.

This is primarily due to the fact that coastal south

Louisiana is a very mature area, has been thoroughly explored, and
only the most expensive oil remains in place.

The imposition of

costly regulations will reinforce this trend, but the effects may be
small and more in the nature of delays in the timing of exploratory
drilling and discovery of new fields.

Again, the presence of

multicollinearity requires caution in interpreting and using these
results.
The section of this study devoted to production was similarly
divided into two objectives.

The first objective was to estimate the

relationship between price and production so that a supply elasticity
could be calculated.
parallel models.

This was approached by way of two different but

The first model is an attempt to combine economic

Ill
and geological factors in the analysis by estimating a "natural"
decline rate and then using economic variables to explain deviations
in actual production from the production expected based on the
"natural" decline rate.

This approach implies that oil producing

firms have limited control over the production from their fields and
thus are limited in how they can respond to changes in the net price
of oil.

The other approach is to say simply that firms directly vary

the amount of oil produced in response to changes in net price.
Empirical results reported in Chapter 4 suggest that oil
production is rather insensitive to net price.

The estimated price

parameters are significant in relatively few cases.

Generally, they

are significant for regressions involving smaller fields but
insignificant for those involving larger fields.

In addition, there

are more significant parameters when the residual is the dependent
variable than when actual production is the dependent variable.

This

lends support to the view that producers are constrained in their
responses to changes in price insofar as altering production is
concerned, particularly in large fields.

Estimated price elasticities

of oil production range from a high of 5.81 to a low of 0.27.
simple mean of the elasticities is 1.24.

The

None of the parameters on

the simple Hotelling variable were significant, but a piece-wise
regression using the Hotelling variable indicates that producers may
respond asymmetrically to changes in the Hotelling variable, primarily
in smaller fields.

In the absence of a good model of producer price

expectations, however, this is not a true test of Hotelling's theory.
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The second part of the production study attempts to estimate
lost production volumes caused by early shut down of existing wells,
and to quantify the effects of the regulations on the minimum economic
field size.

Using a model developed by Camm, et.al., an estimate was

made of lost production given the reduction in net price caused by
costly regulations.

The worst case scenario estimate was that 1.6

years of production would be lost.

This 1.6 years is at the end of

the productive life of the field when produced oil volumes are very
low.

Forecasts of production using the decline rates and of costs

using the estimated cost function were made to determine how average
marginal cost would behave over time and at what point this cost would
become greater than price.

This procedure led to estimated losses

between 10.6 million barrels of oil and 4.8 million barrels of o i l ,
depending upon the assumptions m a d e .

The corresponding dollar values

are $170 million and $96 million (these are future values).

These

losses will occur at the end of the life of the fields, in most cases
estimated to be after the turn of the century.

This estimate is based

on econometric results that are counter-intuitive and should be used
and interpreted cautiously.
Minimum economic field size was estimated using a net present
value function, setting it equal to zero and solving for initial
production.

By comparing the initial production calculated at some

benchmark price with the

initial production calculated at the

benchmark price less the

cost of compliance, the impact of the

regulations can be quantified.
is estimated to be quite small.

The impact of the regulations on MEFS
The cost of compliance with the
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regulations will increase MEFS by less than 5%, or 855 barrels of oil
in the first year of production in a worst case scenario.

That is

roughly 2.4 barrels of oil per day over and above what would be needed
in the absence of the regulations to make a field commercially viable.
The initial production level required in this worst case scenario with
the regulations in place is 19,587 barrels per year (first year).
According to knowledgeable petroleum engineers that is a plausible but
by no means exceptional initial production for a well in south
Louisiana.
The most important aspect of this dissertation which needs
further work is that of producer price expectations (see also Walls,
1992).

It is crucial to an understanding of the oil and gas industry

that a good model of how producers' price expectations are formed is
available.

This is not a simple task but it is a most important one

because of the dynamic nature of this non-renewable resource
extraction problem.
It will also be helpful to incorporate a more realistic and
sophisticated model of the tax regime under which producers in coastal
south Louisiana operate.

This would allow comparisons between various

fiscal systems' effects on the petroleum industry.

In the current

atmosphere of fiscal uncertainty in Louisiana this aspect of the model
could become very attractive.
An interest in the economics of enhanced oil recovery (EOR)
activity has been expressed by outside parties.

Analysis of EOR

economics appears to be a rather straightforward adaptation of the
present model.

If domestic oil and gas fields continue to decline and
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the United States becomes more dependent upon foreign oil, EOR will
become the focus of a great deal of attention.

An estimate of the

conditions under which EOR activity is profitable and how
environmental regulations will affect EOR activity will be very
important for policy makers.
An area for research which is not strictly a part of this effort
but which is an adjunct to it is that of the demand side.

A model of

the demand for domestic

petroleum would coincide with the

current work

and provide an estimate

of the price of oil endogenous to

the model,

given some level of production in the rest of the world.

This effort

would not only make the model richer but would make it possible to
estimate the effects of increasing corporate average fuel economy
(CAFE) standards or other demand side factors on the petroleum
industry in south Louisiana.
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